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COMMENT
“ZOOMING IN”: GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE
ROLE OF COURTS IN SHAPING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
DOCTRINE
MADELINE G. ZIEGLER*
The killing of George Floyd at the hands of Minneapolis police officers
shocked the Nation into intense, renewed awareness regarding police use of
force.1 In the wake of increased activism surrounding police conduct,
national attention has turned once again to the qualified immunity doctrine.2
The doctrine of qualified immunity creates a default presumption of
immunity for executive officials performing discretionary functions, and
further protects those actors from financial liability,3 operating as a barrier to
plaintiffs attempting to challenge police conduct.4
Qualified immunity exists as one option amidst a range of other
judicially created immunities for public officials such as absolute immunity
for judicial officials. The qualified immunity doctrine purportedly exists to
shield the government from the burdens of unwarranted, excessive lawsuits
© 2021 Madeline G. Ziegler.
*J.D. Candidate, 2022, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. I would like to
thank Djaq Morris, the Maryland Law Review Executive Board, and Professor David Gray for their
practical advice and moral support. This Comment is dedicated to my daughter, Penelope—my
writing companion during the very first months of her existence—and my mother, Terri—for
everything. This Comment would never have been finished without my husband Judson’s critical
encouragement and support, and Bob and Judy’s commitment to our family. I also want to
acknowledge Aubrey, Paul, and Claire for their constant, cheerful presence in my life; Judah, my
sunshine; and the community of friends and spiritual family who sustain me. Finally, as always,
the greatest glory and highest praise belongs to God.
1. George Floyd: What Happened in the Final Moments of His Life; BBC NEWS (July 16,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52861726; Hannah Klein, Protests Over
George Floyd’s Death Spread Around the World, SLATE (June 5, 2020, 5:03 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/06/george-floyd-worldwide-protests.html.
2. Hailey Fuchs, Qualified Immunity Protection for Police Emerges as Flash Point Amid
Protests, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/us/politics/qualifiedimmunity.html.
3. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555–57 (1967) (establishing qualified immunity for executive
officials and stating the purpose of the doctrine).
4. See Marcus R. Nemeth, Note, How Was That Reasonable? The Misguided Development of
Qualified Immunity and Excessive Force by Law Enforcement Officers, 60 B.C. L. REV. 989, 994
(2019) (“The intersection of qualified immunity and excessive force doctrine has rendered § 1983
plaintiffs highly vulnerable and unlikely to succeed on the merits.”).
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against its executive officials.5 However, growing scholarly consensus
demonstrates that the qualified immunity doctrine insulates police officers
from egregious forms of misconduct,6 promotes “constitutional stagnation,”7
and fails to achieve the proposed reasons for its continued existence, such as
saving the government time and money.8 Yet, even as a surprisingly diverse
consensus of voices denounce qualified immunity, the Supreme Court
continues to enforce the doctrine with gusto, and all signals point to the fact
that the Court’s position is unlikely to change.9 This reality is juxtaposed
with greater public pressure to end the doctrine as applied to police officers
in excessive force cases, and growing dissent within the judiciary itself.10
With this context in mind, this Comment has two purposes: the first is
theoretical, and the second is practical.
First, I seek to reframe the current discussion of qualified immunity by
conceptualizing the doctrine as a mode of government surveillance that
disproportionately impacts individuals of color.11 The qualified immunity
analysis, based both on its historical roots and present application, can be
considered a mode of government surveillance, which subjects plaintiffs’
behavior to an unwarranted level of scrutiny, while analytically overlooking

5. See infra Section I.
6. See Nemeth, supra note 4, at 994 (arguing that the Supreme Court “has rendered victims of
excessive police force helpless” against police misconduct through current qualified immunity
doctrine).
7. Paul W. Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wilson-Saucier Sequencing and the Articulation
of Constitutional Rights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 401, 402 (2009) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s
abandonment of a constitutional-merits first analysis in qualified immunity doctrine stagnates the
development of constitutional law).
8. Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 9 (2017)
(demonstrating empirically that most cases involving qualified immunity do not save the
government from financial burdens).
9. As recently as June 2020, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to cases which challenged
qualified immunity. See Nick Sibilla, Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Challenges to Qualified
Immunity, Only Thomas Dissents, FORBES (June 15, 2020, 1:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
nicksibilla/2020/06/15/supreme-court-refuses-to-hear-challenges-to-qualified-immunity-onlyclarence-thomas-dissents/?sh=401355477fad; see also Jay Schweikert, The Supreme Court’s
Dereliction of Duty on Qualified Immunity, CATO INST. (June 15, 2020, 11:27 AM),
https://www.cato.org/blog/supreme-courts-dereliction-duty-qualified-immunity (positing that the
Court may not hear cases on qualified immunity hoping to “duck” the issue and pressure Congress
into action during a highly politically charged moment).
10. See Zadeh v. Robinson, 902 F.3d 483, 498 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, J., concurring dubitante)
(“I write separately to register my disquiet over the kudzu-like creep of the modern immunity
regime.”); see also James A. Wynn Jr., As a Judge, I Have to Follow the Supreme Court. It Should
Fix This Mistake, WASH. POST (June 12, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2020/06/12/judge-i-have-follow-supreme-court-it-should-fix-this-mistake/ (arguing that
as a federal appellate judge, he believes the Supreme Court must reform the doctrine of qualified
immunity).
11. See infra Section II.A.
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defendant public officials’ conduct.12 In excessive force claims brought
under the Fourth Amendment, which this Comment will focus on, the
qualified immunity doctrine serves as a near-impenetrable veil that
obfuscates the behavior of defendants. Though Section 1983 theoretically
provides an individual cause of action for the deprivation of constitutional
liberties,13 under which the actions of government officials should be
scrutinized, the qualified immunity analysis inverts the court’s gaze to hyperfocus on the conduct of the very individuals whose rights were allegedly
violated.14 Thus, a mode of state oppression lurks even in the legal claim
which supposedly creates a cause of action for the vindication of rights
against law enforcement officers. In other words, even when the “bad
behavior” of a law enforcement officer is supposedly on trial, the court’s eyes
fall heavily on, and even punish, the conduct of the (often) black and brown
claimants.
The second goal of this Comment is practical. The framing of
government surveillance elucidates suggestions for various institutional
actors including courts, legislators, and the general public.15
This Comment is divided into two parts, Background and Analysis. The
Background will recount the historical roots of both the Section 1983 cause
of action and the qualified immunity doctrine, and their connection with
racial conflict in the United States.16 Then, I will unpack challenges plaintiffs
face confronting the qualified immunity doctrine as a defense to liability,
especially in cases of excessive force, focusing in detail on the interpretive
steps courts take in defining constitutional violations, reconstructing facts,
and determining clearly established law based on current Supreme Court
precedent.17 Part I will conclude by recounting the current status of qualified
immunity doctrine on the Supreme Court and in the federal judiciary.18
Moving to the second Part, the Analysis will define government
surveillance and trace its connection with race in the United States through
policing and the legal system.19 Section A will explain how courts may
generally play a role in furthering state oppression and posits that courts may
reverse this trend in Section 1983 claims. Section B will unpack the
ramifications of the government surveillance framing, arguing that the mode

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See infra Section II.B.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See infra Section II.B..
See infra Section II.C..
See infra Section I.A.
See infra Section I.B.
See infra Section I.B..
See infra Section II.A.
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of analysis courts employ in excessive force cases brought under
Section 1983 hyper-scrutinizes the conduct of plaintiffs and simultaneously
“overlooks” the conduct of defendants.20 Thus, courts further the
oppression21 which black and brown individuals are subject to in other
spheres through over-surveillance. The qualified immunity analysis
obfuscates the behavior of defendants in four key ways: (1) by preventing
courts from scrutinizing a defendant’s actual knowledge, (2) by prohibiting
an inquiry into subjective intent, (3) by priming courts to overlook the
conduct of defendants, and (4) by minimizing the role of the objective fact
finder.22 Finally, Section C of the Analysis will offer brief suggestions for
various institutional actors based on the framing of government
surveillance.23
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Foundations of Modern Qualified Immunity Doctrine
Citizens may sue state government officials who violate their federal
constitutional rights for money damages under Section 1983.24 The first
iteration of Section 1983 originated in the Civil Rights Act of 1871.25 After
the Civil War, federal legislators sought to secure the rights of formerly
enslaved persons against various deprivations of liberties threatened by
southern states by passing Reconstruction legislation and the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments.26
Though the Fourteenth Amendment27 guaranteed that no state could
deny life, liberty, or property to a citizen without due process of law, two
problems remained after its passage. First, widespread violence against and
disenfranchisement of formerly enslaved persons continued to pervade many
20. See discussion infra Section II.B.
21. Although I posit that courts play a role in state oppression, this Comment does not imply
that judges consciously seek to oppress the individuals in their courts. My point is that the mode of
analysis courts employ may unwittingly further state oppression.
22. See discussion infra Section II.B.ii.
23. See infra Section II.C. A range of perspectives exist as to whether the doctrine of qualified
immunity, and immunities for state actors in general, should be reformed or abolished entirely. This
Comment does not take a position on any side of the debate, but rather makes suggestions to address
qualified immunity doctrine as it currently exists and pertains to this analysis.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
25. Act of Feb. 28, 1871, 16 Stat. 433, 433–40 (1871).
26. For the political and congressional history of these Acts, see generally Xi Wang, The
Making of Federal Enforcement Laws, 1870-1872: 70 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1013 (1995); Robert J.
Kaczorowski, Congress’s Power to Enforce Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Lessons from Federal
Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187 (2005).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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states, and states either lacked requisite legislation guaranteeing a remedy, or
lacked the power or will to enforce such remedies when rights were
deprived.28 Second, it was unclear whether the President had the power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment independently.29 Thus, when passing the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, now codified as Section 1983, Congress sought to
create a mechanism through which the Fourteenth Amendment could be
enforced.30
For almost a century, Section 1983 lay dormant as a cause of action. 31
But in 1961, the Supreme Court held, in Monroe v. Pape,32 that action “under
color of law”33 includes a variety of state action, and does not simply pertain
to state officials enforcing state laws.34 In other words, “Monroe definitively
determined that Section 1983’s scope was as broad as the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”35 Following Monroe, federal courts experienced a
flood of Section 1983 lawsuits for the first time. Importantly, the judicial
quickening of the Section 1983 cause of action came about amidst newly
emerging national concerns about racial deprivations of liberty.36 In Monroe,
police officers executed a warrantless entry into a black family’s home, made
the parents and children strip naked while the officers searched their
apartment, and then arrested one of the family members on baseless
charges.37 Understood in its “political and social setting[],” the Monroe
decision was reached by a newly race-conscious, post-Brown Supreme Court
in the midst of the Civil Rights era.38
The text of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 did not mention immunity for
government officials.39 Yet, in Pierson v. Ray,40 the Supreme Court suddenly
extended a version of the common law immunity of judicial officials to

28. Grant’s Address, Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 244 (1871).
29. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172–74 (1961).
30. Id.
31. James J. Park, The Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 393, 412 (2003).
32. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
33. Id. at 186–87.
34. Id. at 185.
35. Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 is Born: The Interlocking Supreme Court Stories of Tenney
and Monroe, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1019, 1059 (2013).
36. Id. at 1020–22.
37. 365 U.S. at 169.
38. Nahmod, supra note 35, at 1023.
39. See Caroline H. Reinwald, A One-Two Punch: How Qualified Immunity’s Double Dose of
Reasonableness Dooms Excessive Force Claims in the Fourth Circuit, 98 N.C. L. REV. 665, 667
(2020) (tracing the history of common law immunities).
40. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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executive actors such as police officers in Section 1983 claims.41 The Court
reached its conclusion by reading Section 1983 against the background of
other common law immunities—for example, the total immunity available to
judges and legislators—as well as the common law defenses available to
police officers in tort actions—for example, the defenses of good faith and
probable cause when making an arrest.42
Like the Court’s extension of the Section 1983 cause of action in
Monroe, the origin of modern qualified immunity for executive officials in
Pierson also must be read against the historical backdrop of the Civil Rights
era. In Pierson, the Court was asked to consider whether police officer
respondents who arrested peaceful black ministers attempting to enter a
“White Only” waiting room in Mississippi as an act of civil disobedience
could be held liable by those individuals.43 The Court sided with the white
officers and held that they were free from liability if they had acted in good
faith with probable cause under a statute believed to be valid when making
the arrest.44
Despite its jurisprudential leap in Pierson, the Court did not explain the
extent of immunity executive officials were entitled to. Over the next decade,
the Court clarified that immunity for executive officials was conditional
(“qualified”) rather than absolute, and defined as “the existence of reasonable
grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances,
coupled with good-faith belief . . . for acts performed in the course of official
conduct.”45 Still, the Court continued to deny immunity to officials based on
either an objective showing when those officials reasonably should have
known that their action would violate a constitutional right, or a subjective
showing that the officials acted with “malicious intention” to deprive
someone of a Constitutional right.46

41. Id. at 555–57.
42. Id. at 556–57. See also 5 Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, Jr. & Oscar S. Gray, HARPER,
JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS § 29.10 (3d ed. 2020) (Discussing the “broad[] privilege” developed in
actions against judicial officials at common law, the history of common law immunities awarded to
public officials, and various policy justifications for judicial immunity such as safeguards built into
the judicial process to prevent unconstitutional conduct; “That privilege has been extended by the
weight of American case law to other officials whose functions are neither judicial nor . . . related
to judicial . . . activities. These have included both legislative officials and a host of other officers
whose responsibilities are essentially administrative”; The main justification for the extension of
this immunity is based on “questions of the proper relationship between coordinate branches of
government.”).
43. 386 U.S. 547 at 553.
44. Id. at 555.
45. Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247–48 (1974).
46. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
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Then, in 1982, the Supreme Court rewrote the qualified immunity
playbook in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.47 First, the Harlow court clarified that
courts should no longer consider an official’s subjective intent in
Section 1983 claims because the fact-intensive question of subjective intent
would needlessly subject the government to the burdens of discovery, as well
as the time and costs of trial.48 In eliminating the subjective branch of the
analysis, the Court specifically declared its desire to limit the amount of cases
against government officials that are decided on the merits. 49 Second, the
Court clarified the new standard: Executive officials performing
discretionary functions are immune from suit when “their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.”50
After Harlow, the doctrine of qualified immunity has become a
formidable defense to individuals whose constitutional rights have allegedly
been violated by executive officials like police officers. The following
sections explain why the qualified immunity analysis so often excuses
defendant-executive officials from liability in a Section 1983 claim.
B. Challenges Presented by the Qualified Immunity Analysis51
Based on the Supreme Court’s standard in Harlow, courts now apply a
two-part test to determine whether qualified immunity applies: (1) whether a
constitutional violation occurred, and (2) whether the right was clearly
established at the time of the violation.52
i. The First Prong of the Qualified Immunity Analysis: Constitutional
Violation
The first prong of the qualified immunity analysis has followed a strange
developmental path under Supreme Court precedent: Today, courts have
license to functionally ignore the question of whether a constitutional
violation occurred in favor of relying on the test’s second prong (i.e., whether
the right was clearly established at the time of the violation). Yet, ignoring
this first question has produced constitutional stagnation, and contributed to
47. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
48. Id. at 815–16.
49. Id. at 815–16, 818.
50. Id. at 818.
51. Importantly, this brief treatment of the complex issues presented by the qualified immunity
doctrine is not exhaustive. Many issues are beyond the scope of this Comment. For a more thorough
treatment of the issue, see generally John C. Jeffries Jr., What’s Wrong With Qualified Immunity?,
62 FLA. L. REV. 851 (2010).
52. See, e.g., City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (per curiam) (outlining
the two-step analysis).
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slow and conflicting precedents when courts face novel issues.53 I will only
briefly address the first prong of the test, because most of this analysis centers
on the second prong—determining clearly established law.
Following Harlow, courts exercised their own discretion to determine
when the constitutional violation question must be addressed in a
Section 1983 analysis.54 Despite promptings from the Supreme Court
suggesting a constitutional merits-first analysis,55 courts failed to address the
question first, if at all.56 Then, after two decades of uncertainty, in Saucier v.
Katz57 the Supreme Court mandated that the constitutional question must be
considered first, before reaching the issue of clearly established law.58
By addressing the constitutional question first, a court is more likely to
determine the existence or non-existence of a constitutional right, thus
engaging in constitutional development.59 Under constitutional merits-first
sequencing, a court may find that a constitutional right existed in a given
case, even if the officer did not violate that right under the circumstances or
under the second prong of the analysis.60 This finding leaves the door open
for plaintiffs to establish a violation existed under similar facts in the future.61
Without mandatory sequencing, the danger is that the constitutional questions

53. Hughes, supra note 7, at 417.
54. Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36
PEPP. L. REV. 667, 672–673 (2009) (recounting the history of discretionary sequencing under the
doctrine).
55. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991) (“A necessary concomitant to the
determination of whether the constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff is ‘clearly established’ at the
time the defendant acted is the determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a
constitutional right at all. Decision of this purely legal question permits courts expeditiously to
weed out suits which fail the test without requiring a defendant who rightly claims qualified
immunity to engage in expensive and time consuming preparation to defend the suit on its merits.”).
56. See Leong, supra note 54, at 670 (finding, in one empirical study, that “courts avoided the
constitutional question in over a quarter of the cases in which the government officer raised a
qualified immunity defense”).
57. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
58. Id. at 200–01 (“In a suit against an officer for an alleged violation of a constitutional right,
the requisites of a qualified immunity defense must be considered in proper sequence. . . . A court
required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must consider, then, this threshold question:
Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the
officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry.”).
59. Hughes, supra note 5353, at 404.
60. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 (The Court recognized this principle in Saucier by noting that
addressing the constitutional violation question first allows courts to “set forth principles” important
for constitutional analyses in similar cases in the future, creating a case-by-case development of
constitutional law).
61. Sarah Lochert, Note, Qualified Immunity, Constitutional Stagnation, and the Global War
on Terror, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 829, 838–39 (2011).
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at stake will remain unaddressed, leaving future plaintiffs without clear
insight, and stagnating the development of the law.62
Yet, in Pearson v. Callahan, 63 the Supreme Court abruptly changed
course and overruled Saucier, allowing courts discretion to address or omit
the constitutional violation question. 64 The Court reasoned in Pearson that
merits-first sequencing imposes an unnecessary burden on lower courts,
despite the availability of alternative bases upon which the courts could easily
dispose of a case.65 The Pearson decision has been widely criticized for
creating confusion among the very courts that discretionary sequencing
supposedly helped.66
Additionally, the abolishment of mandatory
sequencing means that courts may be more likely to delay in resolving cases
when the court faces a novel constitutional question, such as the use of
evolving technologies by law enforcement officers.67 Even the Supreme
Court avoids addressing the constitutional violation question. In one of the
Court’s most recent qualified immunity decisions, Kisela v. Hughes,68 the
Court skipped the constitutional violation question entirely and proceeded
directly to an analysis of whether the law was clearly established.69
In summary, because plaintiffs must access a large body of case law
specific to their claim to succeed in qualified immunity cases, judicial
avoidance of the constitutional question may significantly limit plaintiffs’
ability to successfully bring a case on qualified immunity grounds.70

62. Hughes, supra note 53, at 401.
63. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
64. Id. at 227 (“We now hold that the Saucier procedure should not be regarded as an inflexible
requirement . . . .”).
65. See id. at 235 (recounting criticisms on this basis from various members of the Court).
66. See Joanna C. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 318 (2020)
(“The Court’s decision in Pearson has been widely criticized for creating confusion about the scope
of constitutional rights.”).
67. See Zadeh v. Robinson, 902 F.3d 483, 499 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, J., concurring dubitante)
(“If courts leapfrog the underlying constitutional merits in cases raising novel issues like digital
privacy, then constitutional clarity—matter-of-fact guidance about what the Constitution requires—
remains exasperatingly elusive.”); Schwartz, supra note 66, at 318 (“This concern is particularly
acute for constitutional claims regarding novel practices and technologies, like Tasers and drones,
for which there are few pre-Pearson decisions, and it can take many cases over many years for
circuits to issue clarifying rulings.”).
68. 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (per curiam).
69. Id. at 1152 (“Here, the Court need not, and does not, decide whether Kisela violated the
Fourth Amendment when he used deadly force against Hughes.”).
70. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 66, at 319 (“In a world without qualified immunity, it would
be more difficult for district and appellate courts to avoid ruling on the merits of plaintiffs’
constitutional claims.”).
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ii. The Second Prong of the Qualified Immunity Analysis: Clearly
Established Law
Even when a court finds that an official violated a plaintiff’s
constitutional right, the claim may (and often does) fail when the court
considers whether the right was clearly established at the time of the
violation.71 Despite the importance of the “clearly established” branch of the
qualified immunity analysis, the standard is mired in confusion. First, it is
unclear at what level of generality courts must analyze constitutional
violations, creating a highly fact-specific approach, which virtually
guarantees defeat for plaintiffs. Second, it remains unclear whether a court
may consider persuasive authority as well as binding authority in the clearly
established law analysis, creating a circuit split that only the Supreme Court
can resolve.
a. Generality of Clearly Established Law
Following its decision in Harlow, in Anderson v. Creighton,72 the
Supreme Court clarified that in order to succeed on a Section 1983 claim,
plaintiffs cannot simply allege a violation of “extremely abstract rights.” 73
Instead, the violated right must be “particularized” and “sufficiently clear that
a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right.”74 Yet, the Court has not clearly signaled what level of factual
similarity between a case and prior precedent is necessary to constitute
clearly established law.
On one hand, since Anderson, the Court has consistently limited the
clearly established law analysis to apply to narrowly defined, factually-bound
rights. In Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 75 the Supreme Court rejected the notion that
courts can find clearly established law “at a high level of generality,”76
specifically noting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit erred
in finding clearly established law by looking to the general history and
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.77 On the other hand, the Supreme Court
has denied that a particularized right entails exact factual similarity to
precedent.78
71. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (iterating the “clearly established” standard
for the first time).
72. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
73. Id. at 639.
74. Id. at 640.
75. 563 U.S. 731 (2011).
76. Id. at 742.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 741.
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Yet, the instruction that “existing precedent must have placed the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate”79 is interpreted by courts,
in practice, to entail just such a fact-bound analysis.80 As a result, the
inability to find factually similar cases cripples plaintiffs’ claims, especially
when the violation is novel.81 Thus, the “clearly established” inquiry creates
a system in which an official may violate a constitutional right, but as long
as he is the first to violate the right, he will probably not be found liable.
Directed to perform a fact-bound analysis without relying wholly on the
facts, federal courts have developed vastly disparate approaches to the clearly
established law analysis. Some circuits demand legal precision and virtual
factual identicality,82 adopting a formalist approach.83 Others, seeking to find
breathing room for plaintiffs, define rights generally, and risk that their
decisions will be summarily reversed by the Supreme Court. The Ninth
Circuit has been a specific victim of the Supreme Court’s summary reversals
on the issue of clearly established law.84 Recently, the Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision denying qualified immunity to a police
officer on this precise issue, accusing the Ninth Circuit of relying on an
overly broad “right to be free of excessive force” instead of defining the right
by asking “whether clearly established law prohibited the officers from
stopping and taking down a man in these circumstances.”85
The Supreme Court has been surprisingly active in addressing the issue
of clearly established law, to plaintiffs’ detriment. From 2001 to 2016, the
Court issued eighteen decisions addressing whether a right was clearly
established in qualified immunity cases, finding in sixteen cases that the
defendants did not violate clearly established law.86 Many of these decisions
came as summary reversals.87 The Court’s actions have led scholars and
79. Id.
80. Jefferies, supra note 51, at 854–55.
81. See id. (Further specifying that “the fact-specific . . . approach does not mesh
with . . . constitutional law or with the antecedent methodology of the common law,” because
courts, including the Supreme Court, commonly draw general principles from precedent in applying
the law to novel facts).
82. See Mark R. Brown, The Fall and Rise of Qualified Immunity: From Hope to Harris, 9
NEV. L.J. 185, 197 (2008) (analyzing the overly fact-bound approach taken by the Eleventh Circuit
for over a decade).
83. See Tyler Finn, Note, Qualified Immunity Formalism: ‘Clearly Established Law’ and the
Right to Record Police Activity, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 445, 446–48 (2019) (identifying a circuit split
among federal appellate courts on the First Amendment right to record police activity; some circuits
take a formalist approach, relying only on nearly factually identical cases within the circuit).
84. See, e.g., City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 502 (2019) (per curiam).
85. Id. at 503.
86. Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN. L.
REV. HEADNOTES 62, 63 (2016).
87. Id.
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dissenters on the Court alike to conclude that the Court’s majority does
demand near factual identicality in order to warrant the title of clearly
established law.88 The Court’s frequent summary reversals, therefore,
operate as a way to keep federal circuit courts in line and ensure that they
continue to “stick to the facts.”89
b. Sources of Authority for Clearly Established Law
Another challenge faced by lower courts in determining clearly
established law is whether courts must rely only on binding authority (from
the Supreme Court and their own circuit), or whether persuasive authority
may also constitute clearly established law. Significantly, the Supreme Court
declined to address this question in Harlow’s90 original holding, and over
nearly four decades, the Court has continued to waver cryptically on the
issue. On one hand, the Court has intimated that a consensus of persuasive
authority may demonstrate clearly established law,91 and, in Hope v.
Peltzer,92 even looked to persuasive authority in its analysis of an Eighth
Amendment violation.93 Yet, the Court subsequently restricted the standard
for what may constitute a consensus of persuasive authority,94 and has even
gone so far as to question whether a circuit’s own case law may be “a
dispositive source of clearly established law.”95
88. Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1161 (2018) (per curiam) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(“The majority’s decision, no matter how much it says otherwise, ultimately rests on a faulty
premise: that those cases are not identical to this one. But that is not the law, for our cases have
never required a factually identical case to satisfy the ‘clearly established’ standard.”).
89. See Salazar-Limon v. Houston, 137 S. Ct. 1277, 1282 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari) (noting “a disturbing trend regarding the use of this Court’s resources”
regarding the frequency of the Court’s summary reversals in qualified-immunity cases); William
Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 48 (2018) (noting and critiquing
the trend that the Supreme Court has been surprisingly willing to grant qualified immunity a place
on its docket through summary reversals).
90. 457 U.S. 800 (1982)
91. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999) (“Petitioners have not brought to our
attention any cases of controlling authority in their jurisdiction at the time of the incident that clearly
established the rule on which they seek to rely, nor have they identified a consensus of cases of
persuasive authority such that a reasonable officer could not have believed that his actions were
lawful.”) (emphasis added).
92. 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
93. See id. at 744–45 (Referencing cases from other circuits, but ultimately concluding that the
case law presented no relevant persuasive authority. However, the Court later referenced a
Department of Justice report to support its conclusion, which is technically a source of persuasive
authority).
94. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741–42 (2011) (clarifying that any consensus
of persuasive authority must be “robust” and so clear that the relevant precedent “must have placed
the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate,” creating a noticeably higher threshold for
clearly established law).
95. Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665–66 (2012).
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Despite the Supreme Court’s reticence, the source of clearly established
law can be critical in a qualified immunity analysis. If a plaintiff is allowed
to rely on persuasive authority to build their case, the universe of potentially
factually similar precedent expands significantly. Given the importance of
factual similarity, the difference between relying on one circuit’s case law
versus the broader universe of case law can be the differentiating factor
between victory and certain defeat for plaintiffs.96 The Supreme Court has
suggested that the critical question for courts is whether including case law
from other circuits constitutes sufficient notice for government officials.97
However, relying on an overly restrictive body of law may dangerously sever
the qualified immunity analysis from the reasonableness standard which
supposedly must govern the action of government officials, as well as other
sources which influence government behavior, such as internal policy.98
Federal circuits are split on this issue. Some circuits, such as the
Eleventh Circuit, rely only on binding precedent as established by the highest
state courts in the jurisdiction as well as the Supreme Court.99 Other circuits,
such as the First, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, are willing to
look beyond the decisions of their jurisdictions, and the Sixth Circuit is
willing to do so “grudgingly.”100 The Ninth Circuit considers the widest body
of case law, even going so far as to consider the unpublished opinions of
other circuit courts.101
The Supreme Court has done little to resolve the circuit split in its most
recent qualified immunity decisions, but its dicta suggest a more conservative
approach. In City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 102 the Court
essentially dodged the question, concluding that, “to the extent that a ‘robust
consensus of cases of persuasive authority’ could itself clearly establish the
federal right respondent alleges, no such consensus exists here.”103 And in
City of Escondido v. Emmons,104 the Court muddied the waters in an area of

96. See Finn, supra note 83, at 460 “”(“Limiting the sources of law . . . makes for a restrictive
and formalist assessment.”).
97. Id at 460 n.92.
98. In overly formalist jurisdictions, the question essentially becomes: “Is there a specific
controlling case that would put an officer on notice that his behavior is unreasonable?” The question
should be: “Does a critical mass of law and policy exist that would put an officer on notice that his
behavior is unreasonable?” See generally Jeffries, supra note 51.
99. Id. at 858–59.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015).
103. Id. at 1778 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)).
104. 139 S. Ct. 500 (2019).

2021]

“ZOOMING IN”

843

general consensus by implying that the circuit’s own appellate case law may
not constitute binding precedent.105
iii. Challenges Presented by the Qualified Immunity Doctrine in
Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Claims
With the general challenges presented by the qualified immunity
doctrine established, this discussion now turns to the unique challenges
presented by the doctrine in the context of excessive force claims.
Excessive force claims brought under the Fourth Amendment, which
protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures by government
officials, are governed by a unique application of the qualified immunity
analysis. The Supreme Court developed the test for what constitutes
excessive force in Graham v. Connor.106 In Graham, the Court held, first,
that based on the text of the Fourth Amendment, courts should not consider
an officer’s subjective intent in favor of an “‘objective reasonableness’
standard,” and second, that this reasonableness standard should be largely
governed by the individual facts of the case based on the “totality of
circumstances.”107 Specifically, in weighing the actions of the officers,
courts must consider “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether
he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” 108
The Graham analysis creates barriers for plaintiffs because the standard
is based on a highly factually specific analysis muddled by conflicting
Supreme Court precedent. The Court has acknowledged that the Graham
analysis yields vastly different results on what exactly constitutes reasonable
force.109 Facing cases involving similar issues, the Court has come to
divergent decisions; for example, in Tennessee v. Garner,110 the Court found
an officer liable for using deadly force for shooting at a fleeing suspect, yet
in Scott v. Harris,111 declined to find an officer liable for shooting at a fleeing
suspect.112 It seems to follow that one or two facts can change the outcome
105. See id. at 503 (“Assuming without deciding that a court of appeals decision may constitute
clearly established law for purposes of qualified immunity . . . .”).
106. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
107. Id. at 392, 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985)).
108. Id. at 396.
109. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (“Although respondent’s attempt to craft an
easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment context is admirable, in the end we must still
slosh our way through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’”).
110. 471 U.S. at 3.
111. 550 U.S. at 376.
112. Nemeth, supra note 4, at 1015 n.126 (identifying this trend; further identifying that the
Supreme Court’s precedents on the use of force appropriate to stop fleeing suspects are conflicting).
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for cases which seem, on their faces, remarkably similar. Thus, in Graham,
the Court created a “reasonableness test that is inherently fact bound.”113
Many concluded that it would be superfluous for a court to perform both
the excessive force and qualified immunity analyses in the same case, given
the near-identicality of the fact-bound reasonableness standards.114
However, the Supreme Court has held otherwise. Specifically, in Saucier v.
Katz,115 the Supreme Court rejected eliminating the qualified immunity
analysis in excessive force cases based on the near-identicality of the two
standards.116 The Court reasoned that though the Graham analysis
determines whether an officer made a reasonable mistake in applying force,
the qualified immunity inquiry determines whether the officer made a
reasonable mistake “as to the legal constraints on particular police
conduct.”117 In other words, the qualified immunity analysis is primarily
concerned with whether an officer had notice that a mistake would be
unreasonable, as supplied by clearly established law. Thus, an officer can
make an unreasonable mistake under Graham, yet still warrant qualified
immunity if he did not have notice that the mistake would be unlawful.
In summary, the qualified immunity standard, as applied to excessive
force cases, produces a strange double reasonableness regime. Even within
the Court, dissenting Justices have suggested that the qualified immunity
standard applies to Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases, essentially
duplicating the same reasonableness analysis, usually in favor of the
defendant-government officials.118
iv. The Current State of the Law for Qualified Immunity
Growing scholarly consensus demonstrates that the qualified immunity
doctrine insulates police officers from even the most egregious forms of
misconduct,119 promotes constitutional stagnation, 120 and fails to achieve the
proposed reasons for its continued existence, such as saving the government
113. Reinwald, supra note 39, at 670.
114. Nemeth, supra note 4, at 1015.
115. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
116. Id. at 197.
117. Id. at 205.
118. See id. at 215–17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“As the foregoing discussion indicates,
however . . . [t]he constitutional issue whether an officer’s use of force was reasonable in given
circumstances routinely can be answered simply by following Graham’s directions. . . . Once it has
been determined that an officer violated the Fourth Amendment . . . there is simply no work for a
qualified immunity inquiry to do.”); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 648 (1987)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (objecting to the “double standard of reasonableness” created by the
qualified immunity analysis in Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases).
119. See supra note 6.
120. See supra note 7.
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time and money.121 However, even as a surprisingly diverse consensus of
voices have denounced qualified immunity,122 the Supreme Court has
addressed qualified immunity only sparingly in the last decade, mostly
through pro-defendant summary reversals.123 In June 2020, the Court denied
certiorari to nine cases involving qualified immunity.124
Therefore, though calls to end the doctrine of qualified immunity are not
new, the Supreme Court continues to enforce the doctrine.125 This reality is
juxtaposed with greater public pressure to end the doctrine, and growing
dissent within the lower federal judiciary.126 Most notably, two members of
the Court, Justices Sotomayor and Thomas, have explicitly vocalized
willingness to re-examine and potentially overturn the doctrine for at least
three years.127 Dissenting from the Supreme Court’s most recent refusal to
grant certiorari to a batch of qualified immunity cases in 2020, in Baxter v.
Bracey,128 Justice Thomas further criticized qualified immunity and indicated
continued willingness to overturn the doctrine based on his position that the
judge-made doctrine strays from the statute’s text.129
v. Summary
In the midst of the Civil Rights era, in Monroe v. Pape the Supreme
Court breathed life into a piece of Reconstruction legislation, now codified
as Section 1983, which served to give teeth to the Fourteenth Amendment.130
Six years later, faced with an onslaught of Section 1983 litigation in federal

121. See supra note 8.
122. For example, the two Supreme Court Justices who have signaled a willingness to revisit the
doctrine, Justice Sotomayor and Justice Thomas, often fall on divergent sides of the political
spectrum. Similarly, lower federal court criticism has stemmed from both liberal judges, and
notably, even from more conservative, Trump-appointed judges. See supra note 10.
123. See, e.g., City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 504 (2019) (per curiam); Kisela v.
Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 312 (2015)
(per curiam); Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (per curiam); City & Cnty. of S.F. v.
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1778 (2015).
124. Sibilla, supra note 9.
125. Schweikert, supra note 9.
126. See, e.g., Zadeh v. Robinson, 902 F.3d 483, 498 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, J., concurring
dubitante) (“I write separately to register my disquiet over the kudzu-like creep of the modern
immunity regime.”).
127. See Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the doctrine for becoming “an absolute shield for law enforcement officers, gutting the deterrent
effect of the Fourth Amendment”); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1872 (2017) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“In an appropriate case, we should reconsider our
qualified immunity jurisprudence.”).
128. 140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020).
129. Id. at 1862 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
130. See supra Section I.A.
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courts, the Court suddenly extended a version of common law judicial and
legislative immunity to law enforcement officers in Pierson v. Ray.131 Now,
the qualified immunity doctrine serves as a formidable hurdle for plaintiffs.
Courts must follow a two-step analysis for qualified immunity. In the first
branch of the analysis, courts inquire whether a constitutional violation
occurred.132 Courts are permitted to skip this question entirely, stunting the
availability of Constitutional precedent for future plaintiffs.133 Courts must
also determine whether the individual’s right was clearly established at the
time of the alleged violation.134 Many courts require that plaintiffs
demonstrate a clearly established right through near factual identicality to
prior case law, drawing only on mandatory sources of authority.135
In addition to the general challenges presented by the qualified
immunity doctrine, plaintiffs face additional challenges in excessive force
claims brought under the Fourth Amendment.136 A defendant-executive
official will not be liable even if he uses unreasonable force, so long as the
court finds he did not have constitutional notice through prior case law.137
Thus, the “double reasonableness” regime creates double barriers for
plaintiffs. Even faced with formidable scholarly, judicial, and public
opposition, the doctrine of qualified immunity continues to shield law
enforcement officers in Section 1983 actions.
II. ANALYSIS
In this Part, I argue that the courts’ application of the qualified immunity
analysis, based both on its historical roots and present application, should be
considered a method of government surveillance. The framing of
government surveillance reveals that the qualified immunity analysis, as
applied in cases of excessive force, is dangerously void of analytical balance,
lacking an objective gaze. Specifically, the combination of the qualified
immunity and excessive force analyses results in an unwarranted level of
scrutiny aimed at plaintiffs, while analytically obfuscating and veiling
defendant-public officials’ conduct.
Part I recounted how the historical origin of the Section 1983 claim is
inextricably linked to racial conflict and the deprivation of civil rights. In the
modern era, scholars have demonstrated that government surveillance, most
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

386 U.S. 547, 555–57 (1967).
See supra Section I.B.
See supra Section I.B.i.
See supra Section I.B.ii.
See supra Section I.B.ii.b.
See supra Section I.B.iii.
See supra Section I.B.iii.
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notably made physically manifest through “Broken Windows” policing,138
disparately impacts impoverished communities, as well as brown and Black
individuals.139 However, the eye of the state, as well as its modes of
oppression, does not stop at overly invasive, physical methods of policing.
Scholars such as Michelle Alexander have famously demonstrated how
increased surveillance of minority groups has led to a new legal caste system
in the United States through the mass incarceration of Black men.140
In some ways, this analysis builds on the fundamental premises of this
scholarship. However, I am interested in addressing how the state’s
oppression of low-income individuals and communities of color lurks even
in the legal claim that supposedly creates a cause of action for the vindication
of rights against law enforcement officers. I seek to demonstrate that even
when the “bad behavior” of a law enforcement officer is supposedly on trial,
the court’s eyes instead fall heavily on, and even punish, the conduct of the
(often) Black and brown claimants.
Section II.A draws the contours of this theoretical framework, first by
defining government surveillance and explaining how government
surveillance plays a role in policing and punishment in the United States.
Section II.B outlines how the framing of government surveillance illuminates
specific issues courts confront in applying the qualified immunity analysis in
excessive force cases, mainly through factual reconstruction that hyperfocuses on the plaintiffs’ conduct and obfuscates the behavior of defendants.
Section II.B also draws on case studies of recent Supreme Court and federal
appellate court decisions to demonstrate the theoretical framework. Finally,
Section II.C draws on observations from these case studies to create
suggestions for various institutional actors, including courts seeking to apply
the qualified immunity analysis in a way that regains analytical balance, as
well as legislators hoping to reform the doctrine, and the public.141

138. Broken Windows policing is the name commonly given to proactive policing policies
implemented in the 1980s and 1990s in major cities across the United States, inspired by Kelling
and Wilson’s famous article on order maintenance of the same name. See George L. Kelling &
James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/.
139. See infra Section II.A.ii.
140. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
141. Obviously, many interests seek the total abolishment of qualified immunity as a legal
defense. However, this Comment will consider how state legislators could potentially reform
qualified immunity if the alternative of reform is chosen. For a discussion on the benefits of
reforming, rather than abolishing, the doctrine of qualified immunity, see generally John C. Jeffries,
Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207 (2013).
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A. Government Surveillance, Race, and the Legal System
i. Defining Surveillance
The concept of surveillance has long been linked to the government’s
assessment and control of criminality.142 Quite literally, surveillance is “the
careful watching of a person or place, especially . . . because of a crime that
has happened or is expected.”143 In his seminal work, Discipline and Punish:
The Birth of the Prison, Michel Foucault argues that from the eighteenth to
the twentieth century, the state’s primary means of punishment changed from
public spectacle to surveillance.144 According to Foucault, through
omnipresent, constant surveillance, the state maintains control by quickly
perceiving and correcting the actions of “delinquent” citizens.145 As an
example, Foucault drew on the model of the “Panopticon” prison created by
eighteenth century philosopher Jeremy Bentham.146 In the Panopticon, an
all-seeing prison guard sat at the center of a large, spherical prison structure
in which he could peer into every prisoner’s room.147 The state, by analogy,
constantly watches its citizens and exercises control through piercing,
oppressive, and omnipresent scrutiny.148
Modern commenters on surveillance often focus on the legal
ramifications of new surveillance technologies, such as drones, and their
intersection with the right to privacy,149 as well as the First Amendment right
to free speech150 and the Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable
searches and seizures.151 However, it is worth noting that the implications of
surveillance go well beyond an examination of the latest surveillance
technologies, which often dominates the discussion. The focus on advancing
142. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1977).
143. Surveillance, THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/
dictionary/english/surveillance (Nov. 28, 2020).
144. FOUCALT, supra note 142, at 195–208.
145. Id.
146. Michel Foucalt, “Panopticism” from Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison., 2
RACE/ETHNICITY: MULTIDISCIPLINARY GLOB. CONTEXTS 1, 5 (2008).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See W. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196
(1890) (arguing for the existence of a Constitutional “right to privacy.”); see also Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 129 (1972) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972)) (arguing that a Constitutional right to “personal . . . privacy” emanates from
the “penumbras” of rights guaranteed through the Bill of Rights). In this context, the “right to
privacy” has typically been construed as a right to decisional or bodily autonomy.
150. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”).
151. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
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technologies often obfuscates means of surveillance that are less flashy or
more structurally embedded in everyday society, emerging “through
legislation, codification, or cultural habit . . . developed or calcified into
systems that fit neatly within our accepted societal institutions . . . virtually
indistinguishable from the backgrounds of our everyday lives.”152 Shifting
the conversation away from surveillance as it relates to informational
privacy, this Comment builds upon a body of scholarship that has instead
analyzed how Black and brown communities are disproportionately, and very
physically, subject to the oppressive gaze of the state through policing and
the legal system, and the implications raised therein under the Fourth
Amendment.
ii. Government Surveillance Through Policing and the Legal System
In the United States, race, criminalization, and surveillance have been
connected since the time of slavery. Some scholars have argued that modern
policing in the United States owes its origins, at least in part, to the regulation
of the slave economy.153 Southern society used methods of control to extend
the arm and eye of the state over enslaved persons and plantation space, such
as slave patrols, which inspected the countryside for signs of escapees, slave
passes, which served as the precursors to modern photo identification, and
fugitive slave posters and laws.154 These methods created a system in which
the overseeing class could “exercise surveillance” over the plantation at all
times.155
The state continues to exercise surveillance over minority bodies
through modern methods of policing, specifically through broken windows
policing156 and intelligence-led policing. In the 1980s, law enforcement in
large cities across the United States began to implement policing tactics that
explicitly focused on aggressive enforcement of minor nuisance crimes, also
called “quality of life” crimes.157 Influenced in part by Kelling and Wilson’s
famous article, Broken Windows, police employed methods such as stop and

152. Jeffrey L. Vagle, The History, Means, and Effects of Structural Surveillance 10 (U. Penn.
L. Sch., Pub. L. Rsch. Paper No. 16-3, 2016) (defining this kind of surveillance by the helpful term,
“structural surveillance”).
153. See generally, e.g., CHRISTIAN PARENTI, THE SOFT CAGE: SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA,
FROM SLAVERY TO THE WAR ON TERROR (2004); SALLY HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS (2003).
154. See HADDEN, supra note 153, at 41–71.
155. See PARENTI, supra note 153, at 13–33.
156. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
157. Id.
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frisk,158 or “Terry stops,”159 and concentrated misdemeanor arrests as a way
to deter crime through order maintenance.160
Broken windows policing necessitates increased scrutiny by law
enforcement officials of individuals in “poorly maintained” locations. The
state, surveilling the neighborhood, notes unkempt lawns or littered
sidewalks and catalogues these signs of “disorder” as license to swarm the
community with increased police presence. However, the implementation of
broken windows policing is inequitable, resulting in disproportionate police
presence in places with elevated rates of poverty, as well as minority
neighborhoods.161 The resulting highly concentrated police presence in many
communities creates a state of near-constant police surveillance.
This state of surveillance is not theoretical but rather all too tangible for
those subjected to practices such as stop-and-frisk.162 For example, in New
York City, citizens subjected to stop and frisk experienced bruising, torn
clothing, and even unwanted sexual touching after being searched by
police.163 Living under a state of constant surveillance can be palpably felt.
To lower their chances of being stopped by police, some citizens in overly
policed urban neighborhoods changed their hairstyles and clothing, as well
as their route to work, and adopted the practice of carrying their drivers’
licenses at all times, even when out walking their dogs.164 Another reported
feeling “nervous . . . paranoid, ‘cause you never know what’s going to

158. By stop and frisk, I refer to the policing practice of temporarily detaining people on the
street, questioning them, and also physically searching or “frisking” them through a compulsory,
hands-on search. For example, from 2004 to 2012, the New York Police Department stopped and
frisked more than four million New Yorkers. See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, STOP AND
FRISK: THE HUMAN IMPACT 3 (2012) https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/08/thehuman-impact-report.pdf (defining stop and frisk).
159. “Terry stops” refer to the police practice of stopping citizens based on the standard of
reasonable suspicion, rather than the higher standard of probable cause, approved by the Supreme
Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). I refer to stop and frisk and Terry stops separately
because of the distinct legal ramifications of many urban law enforcement stop and frisk policies,
as opposed to “Terry stops” generally.
160. Jeffrey Fagan, Anthony A. Braga, Rod K. Brunson & April Pattavina, Stops and Stares:
Street Stops, Surveillance, and Race in the New Policing, 43 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 539, 542 (2016).
161. See id. at 544; see also Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows:
Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 463–64 (2000) (“We find
little evidence to support claims that policing targeted places and signs of physical disorder, and
show instead that stops of citizens were more often concentrated in minority neighborhoods
characterized by poverty and social disadvantage.”).
162. In Terry, the Court acknowledged that a frisk is “a severe . . . intrusion upon cherished
personal security, and it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating
experience.” 392 U.S. at 24–25.
163. See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 158, at 5.
164. Id. at 7.
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happen.”165 Still another captured the unique humiliation of being subject to
suspicious public gaze: “When they stop you in the street, and then
everybody’s looking . . . it does degrade you.”166
Though courts have struck down some explicitly race-based stop and
frisk policies,167 these decisions do not encompass many similar or identical
policing methods that do not explicitly rely on racial “discriminatory intent,”
yet are still implemented in a racially disproportionate manner based on
police discretion.168
In some cities, police have expanded the Terry regime by explicitly
adopting passive or surveillance-based policing models, which “more closely
approximat[e] a panopticonistic vision of policing.”169 For example, the
Boston Police Department mandates that officers must conduct non-contact
surveillances of “known criminal offenders” as well as “known crime
locations” during regular field observation.170 The result is that police log, in
detail, the regular, everyday activities of citizens in the same informational
database that houses information gathered from investigative stops.171 These
“passive surveillance” activities have traditionally been used to track the
activities of high-level criminal suspects denoted as national security
concerns.172 Buoyed by digital-age developments, law enforcement officers
increasingly rely on this kind of information-led, data-management driven
policing.173 The result is a regime that vocally embraces government
surveillance as a way to predict and control the behavior of its citizens,
especially in communities of color.174
165. Id. at 6.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding
New York City liable for stops and frisks which violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
because the stops were not based on “reasonable suspicion.”).
168. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–240 (1976) (stating that for an equal protection
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs must show a facially neutral law with
disproportionate racial impacts was conceived with discriminatory intent). In Floyd, the Court
concluded that racially disproportionate impact of wide-spread, official policy may be a permittable
“starting point” to determine discriminatory intent. 959 F. Supp. 2d at 571.
169. Fagan et. al, supra note 160, at 551.
170. Id. at 547.
171. Id. at 547–551.
172. Id. at 551.
173. See generally Larry Catá Backer, Global Panopticism: States, Corporations, and the
Governance Effects of Monitoring Regimes, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 101, 112–13 (2008)
(tracing developments in globalization and the surveillance state).
174. Fagan, et. al, supra note 160, at 550–51; see also BARTON GELLMAN & SAM ADLER-BELL,
CENTURY
FOUND.,
THE
DISPARATE
IMPACT
OF
SURVEILLANCE
(2017),
https://tcf.org/content/report/disparate-impact-surveillance/?session=1&session=1 (tracing the
disparate impacts of surveillance through policing and the welfare system on communities of color
in the United States).
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State policies that disproportionately surveil communities of color
extend beyond the streets and into courtrooms and prisons. Scholars such as
Michelle Alexander have shown how our very laws and institutions create a
“racialized system of social control” through the mass incarceration of black
bodies.175 For example, laws and policies passed in service of the “War on
Drugs” in the last decades of the twentieth century created disparate levels of
criminal classifications and mandatory sentence lengths176 for drugs more
widely available and used in Black communities, as opposed to drugs used
more often in white communities. 177 As a result, Black men178 are often
convicted at higher rates, for more serious crimes such as felonies, and
remain incarcerated for far longer.179
One can draw a line from the “racialized system of control” created by
the intersection of law and policing in the United States to Foucault’s vision
of the Panopticon, a method of punishment where the state exerts control over
its “delinquent” subjects through total surveillance.180 Just as the guard in
Foucault’s vision sits at the center of the prison, able to turn at any time to
peer into the cell of any prisoner, here the state sits in the streets, the
courtroom, and the jail cell, always able to surveil and scrutinize the behavior
of black and brown communities, with drastic, and demonstrably inequitable,
consequences.
iii. Judicial Discretion and Section 1983 Claims
Courts play a central role in enforcing a racialized system of control,
especially in the criminal sphere, through their role in sentencing. However,
less attention has been paid to the ways that courts use their discretion to
function as mechanisms of racial and social control beyond the obvious
175. ALEXANDER, supra note 140, at 178.
176. Id.
177. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES
SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE S YSTEM IS
ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 113–133 (Nov. 2004). See also DEBORAH J.
VAGINS & JESSELYN MCCURDY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CRACKS IN THE SYSTEM, TWENTY
YEARS OF THE UNJUST FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE LAW i–3 (2006) (explaining the racial and
sentencing disparities between crack versus powder cocaine; “For example, distribution of just 5
grams of crack [cocaine] carries a minimum 5-year federal prison sentence, while for powder
cocaine, distribution of 500 grams – 100 times the amount of crack cocaine – carries the same
sentence.”).
178. Though Alexander’s work focused mostly on the experiences of Black men, other scholars
have shown similar disparate treatment and impacts for women of color. See generally Stephanie
Hong, Say Her Name: The Black Woman and Incarceration, 19 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 619 (2018).
179. ALEXANDER, supra note 140, at 141–47 (explaining that, at the time, the average federal
drug sentence for African Americans was forty-nine percent longer than the average federal drug
sentence for Caucasians).
180. FOUCALT, supra note 142, at 195–208.
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contexts. By obvious contexts, I mean areas of law that obviously implicate
race, such as criminal law, or constitutional claims brought to challenge a
government program that relies on race, pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.181 However, constitutional tort
claims182 against state officials, brought under Section 1983,183 are also
connected with race in powerful and nuanced ways. As recounted in Part I,
legislators passed Section 1983 originally as a means of redress for former
enslaved persons and people of color whose constitutional rights were
violated in southern states following the abolition of slavery.184 Currently,
though no widespread study has been conducted analyzing the demographics
of those who bring claims against law enforcement officers for excessive
force under Section 1983,185 it is reasonable to posit that a greater percentage
of plaintiffs represent racial minorities. This is mostly a statistical proffer.
On the whole, people of color simply are more likely to have more frequent
contacts with the police.186 Given that minority individuals are more likely
to be on the receiving end of police misconduct, the importance of Section
1983 actions for individuals of color should not be understated.
In constitutional tort claims, judges hold the “keys to the kingdom” for
plaintiffs through wide judicial discretion. This judicial latitude is partly to
be expected because of the very nature of constitutional tort law. Awarding
damages to redress constitutional violations is a relatively new practice,
originating with the development of Section 1983. Constitutional tort claims
are therefore considered a kind of quasi-constitutional law, or “subconstitutional law.”187 The novel nature of weighing damages claims for
constitutional
violations
therefore
“requir[es] . . . judicial
creativity. . . reflecting, implicitly or explicitly, the weighing of costs and
benefits.”188
Thus, it is worth noting that the kind of judicial discretion enjoyed by
judges in constitutional tort claims may be wider than areas of law
traditionally linked with race, such as criminal law. For example, even
181. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”).
182. By constitutional tort, I mean an action by which individuals can directly bring claims
against government officials for government-inflicted injury when their constitutional rights are
violated. Constitutional tort claims are generally brought against state officials under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and may be made against federal officials pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971).
183. Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
184. See supra Section I.A.
185. This is true at least to the author’s knowledge at the time of writing.
186. See supra Section II.A.ii
187. Jeffries, supra note 141, at 243.
188. Id.
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judges who would like to impose softer, creative, or alternative solutions to
minor drug offenders may be constrained by mandatory sentencing laws.189
On the other hand, in a Section 1983 claim, the court plays a large role in
determining remedy. For example, the factfinders in Section 1983 claims
may award nominative damages or punitive damages, but as in traditional
tort claims, the judge may overturn a jury verdict if the judge believes jury
damages are excessive.190 In addition, a judge can grant measures beyond
damages such as injunctive relief.191
Judges enjoy the most powerful discretion in Section 1983 claims
through a vice-like grip over procedure. Critically, judges decide whether a
claim should be decided summarily in favor of the defendant-government
official, as is often the case, or proceed to trial. By making this decision,
judges close the door to plaintiffs or keep the door open for a potential
remedy, and judges face heavy pressure from the Supreme Court to decide in
favor of the defendant-government officials.192 Scholars have posited that by
demanding the dismissal of “insubstantial suits” in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,193
the Supreme Court attempted to create a procedural mandate for judges,
couched with the language of substantive law.194 However, as explained in
Part I, this “reasonableness” analysis is infamously open-ended, lacking a
clear liability rule195 and subject to competing directives.
Armed with a curious level of procedural control over the outcome of
Section 1983 litigation, judges fill in the cryptic dead-ends of the qualified
immunity analysis with their own judgement. Scholars have therefore
suggested that the availability of remedies in a Section 1983 claim is almost
solely determined by how a judge interprets qualified immunity and the
identity of the defendant on trial.196
If qualified immunity is read broadly to protect a wide range of
constitutional error . . . the gap [between the rights guaranteed by the
189. See Tracie A. Todd. Mass Incarceration: The Obstruction of Judges. 82 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 191, 199–201 (2019) (reflecting that mandatory sentencing laws leave very little room for
judicial discretion).
190. Sheldon Nahmod, Damages and Injunctive Relief Under Section 1983, 16 URB. LAWYER
201, 203 (1984).
191. See generally United States v. City of Yonkers, 96 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1996) (standing for
the proposition that judges have wide discretion to impose remedies in constitutional tort cases).
192. See supra Section I.B.
193. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
194. Jeffries, supra note 141, at 251 (“As thus interpreted, Harlow announced a change in
substantive law, but it aimed at a change in procedure. It sought to accelerate the dismissal of
insubstantial suits and thus to protect government officers not only from liability but also from the
burdens of discovery and trial.”).
195. Id. at 208–09.
196. Id. at 246.
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Constitution and the availability of a remedy to enforce them] is large. If
qualified immunity were construed more narrowly . . . the gap would be
reduced.197
The conclusion that the outcome of Section 1983 litigation in excessive
force claims is heavily influenced by judicial discretion is clear through the
divergent results in federal courts nominally applying the same analysis. As
noted in Section I, the geographic disparities between the results of Section
1983 cases are glaring. In a recent study analyzing 435 federal district court
rulings in excessive force cases in California and Texas over the span of
almost five years, Texas federal district courts granted immunity to police in
59% of cases as compared to 34% of California cases.198 Courts in Texas,
nominally applying the same analysis as federal district courts in California,
were almost twice as likely to grant officers qualified immunity. At the
appellate level—in a review of 529 cases since 2005—the same study found
that the Fifth Circuit granted qualified immunity to officers in 64% of cases,
in contrast with the Ninth Circuit, which granted qualified immunity in 42%
of cases.199
iv. Summary
So far, Section II.A has defined government surveillance and traced its
connection with state control and punishment generally, as well as its
relationship with race in the United States. In the United States, a system of
social control exists in which low-income and Black and brown bodies are
almost constantly subject to the oppressive gaze of the state through policing
and the law. Courts play a role in perpetuating this system of control—for
example, through sentencing determinations in criminal law. However, the
Section 1983 cause of action provides an arena in which courts have broad
power to provide or deprive low-income persons and racial minorities of
remedies for the deprivation of constitutional rights. Critically, based on the
nature of constitutional tort law, courts enjoy wide discretion in Section 1983
claims and in how the court chooses to interpret the defense of qualified
immunity, leading to vastly divergent outcomes in different federal appellate
circuits.

197. Id.
198. Andrew Chung, Lawrence Hurley, Jackie Botts, Andrew Januta & Guillermo Gomez, For
Cops Who Kill, Special Supreme Court Protection, REUTERS (May 8, 2020, 12:00 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-police-immunity-scotus/.
199. Id.
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B. Unpacking the Ramifications of Qualified Immunity as a Mode of
Government Surveillance
This Section applies the framing of government surveillance to analyze
how courts use their analytical discretion to conduct the qualified immunity
analysis. I suggest that one of the reasons that the current state of the law
heavily favors defendants200 is because the mode of analysis courts employ
in excessive force cases brought under Section 1983 hyper-scrutinizes the
actions of plaintiffs. Bringing the argument full circle, just as Foucault
argued that the state exercises control through piercing, oppressive, and
omnipresent scrutiny, a court may further this state control in excessive force
cases by subjecting the plaintiffs to increased scrutiny. In contrast, courts
may functionally “overlook” the conduct of defendants, saving government
officials from an objective gaze. In this way, courts (unwittingly) further the
oppression which Black and brown individuals, as well as low-income
individuals, are subject to in other spheres through over-surveillance.
This conclusion is unintuitive for several reasons. Most obviously, the
purpose of Section 1983 is to partially waive the government’s immunity
from suit. In Section 1983 claims, the conduct of the government is on trial
through the actions of state officials. One would intuit that in a cause of
action which empowers citizens against the state, the state official’s actions
should be closely scrutinized. However, the opposite is true. The qualified
immunity analysis serves as a way for the courts to invert who and what is
scrutinized in an excessive force claim brought under Section 1983. Section
II.B.i explains how the analysis of excessive force through Graham v.
Connor inverts the court’s gaze to hyper-focus on plaintiffs by reconstructing
facts through the eyes of defendant law enforcement officers. Section II.B.ii
explains how simultaneously, the qualified immunity analysis obfuscates any
meaningful close scrutiny of defendants in four key ways.
i. The Interaction of the Graham Analysis and the Qualified Immunity
Analysis Inverts the Court’s Gaze to Hyper-focus on Plaintiffs
and Overlook the Conduct of Defendants.
First, courts hyper-scrutinize plaintiffs in a Section 1983 excessive force
claim when the court analyzes whether the officer acted with excessive force
under Graham v. Connor.201 The factors in Graham, which determine the
reasonableness of an officer’s actions, explicitly focus on the plaintiff’s
behavior, rather than the action of the defendant-public official. By
examining whether the plaintiff committed a crime, posed a threat to others,
200. See supra Section I.B; see also Schwartz, supra note 8, at 6.
201. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).

2021]

“ZOOMING IN”

857

or actively evaded arrest, courts scrutinize the plaintiff for signs that a
defendant’s use of force was “justified.”
Though courts nominally must consider the “totality of
circumstances”202 and balance the interests of the government against
individual rights,203 in excessive force cases courts are instructed to step into
the shoes of the defendant in reconstructing the facts. The Supreme Court
has specified that the facts “must be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene,” instead of with the “20/20 vision of
hindsight.”204 Even when courts attempt to scrutinize the amount of force a
defendant uses, their scrutiny must be tempered by “allowance for the fact
that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” 205 One could
imagine an analysis that subjects the defendant-law-enforcement officer’s
actions to real scrutiny, based on factors such as whether the defendant used
the least amount of force available, or attempted de-escalation before
engaging in force. But under the current excessive force regime, courts are
encouraged to focus the weight of their judgment on the plaintiff’s actions.206
As a result, the seemingly objective excessive force standard is so focused on
the defendant’s perspective that it becomes subjective, entirely focused on
“the individual actor’s knowledge” of the plaintiff at the moment force was
deployed.207
Graham’s standard may be defended because officers almost always
must act without perfect knowledge in high-stakes situations.208 Therefore,
taking the perspective of the officer may be the only fair way to assess
whether their use of force was reasonable. And perhaps, if courts were not
ordered to perform both the excessive force reasonableness analysis and the
qualified immunity analysis, this would be a fair defense. However, the
“double layer of reasonableness”209 created by the interaction of the two
analyses creates an almost impenetrable layer of subjectivity. The current
qualified immunity analysis ratchets up the level of subjectivity in excessive
force cases further by obfuscating the real motives and behavior of
defendants.
202. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985).
203. Id. at 8.
204. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
205. Kisela v Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam).
206. See Jeffries, supra note 51, at 861.
207. See id. (“Indeed, the Supreme Court’s definition of ‘objective unreasonableness’ might
plausibly be called ‘subjective unreasonableness,’ as it turns so heavily on the individual actor’s
knowledge and situation.”).
208. 490 U.S. at 397.
209. See supra Section I.B.iii.
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The following cases demonstrate how courts hyper-scrutinize plaintiffs,
yet simultaneously shield defendants from scrutiny through the qualified
immunity analysis.
a. Mullenix v. Luna: Whose Behavior is Closely Scrutinized?
A comparison of the majority and dissenting opinions in a recent
Supreme Court case, Mullenix v. Luna,210 illustrates how courts hyper-focus
on the plaintiffs’ conduct in excessive force claims. In Mullenix, the Court
hyper-focused on the plaintiff’s, rather than the defendant’s, conduct in order
to find that a police officer did not violate clearly established law when
shooting at and killing a suspect engaged in a car chase, granting the officer
qualified immunity.211 In its analysis, the Court overwhelmingly focused on
the conduct and characteristics of the decedent, characterizing him as “a
reportedly intoxicated fugitive, set on avoiding capture through high-speed
vehicular flight, who twice during his flight had threatened to shoot police
officers, and who was moments away from encountering an officer at
Cemetery Road.”212
On the other hand, Justice Sotomayor ultimately reached her dissenting
conclusion that Mullenix had violated clearly established law by closely
scrutinizing the defendant Mullenix’s actions. Justice Sotomayor began her
dissenting opinion with the weight of the analytical lens focused fully on the
defendant, Mullenix: “[Defendant] fired six rounds in the dark at a car
traveling 85 miles per hour . . . without any training . . . against the . . . order
of his superior officer . . . .”213 She noted that regardless of the danger the
plaintiff posed, Mullenix still chose to deploy a potentially lethal tactic,214
ignored the orders of superior officers to “stand by,”215 and “spent minutes in
shooting position discussing his next step with a fellow officer” before
making the decision to shoot the decedent.216 Justice Sotomayor even pointed
to a statement made by Mullenix after the shooting, potentially suggesting he
acted with bad faith.217 Perhaps most relevant to this analysis, Justice
Sotomayor explicitly accused the majority of “recharacteriz[ing]” the facts to

210. 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (per curiam).
211. Id. at 308.
212. Id. at 309.
213. Id. at 313 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 314–15.
215. Id. at 314, 316.
216. Id. at 316.
217. Id. at 316 (observing that after killing the decedent, the defendant said to his commanding
officer, “How’s that for proactive?”, referencing a conversation they had earlier that day).
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paint the defendant making a “split-second, heat-of-the-moment choice” as
opposed to a calculated decision to shoot.218
In Mullenix, the majority reached its conclusion granting qualified
immunity to the defendant-officer by focusing its critical lens squarely on an
analysis of the decedent’s behavior. The Court painted Mullenix as an officer
acting in the heat of the moment to take down a grave threat to public safety.
In contrast, by focusing on the defendant’s actions, Justice Sotomayor
painted a starkly different picture of a shooter who had ample time to take an
alternate course of action, but still chose to act with lethal force. Justice
Sotomayor’s dissent in Mullenix illustrates how the court’s hyper-focus on
the plaintiff obscured facts about the defendant relevant to the qualified
immunity analysis.
b. Nelson v. City of Battle Creek and Estate of Jones v. City of
Martinsburg: Zooming In or Out?
A comparison of two recent federal appellate court cases from the Sixth
Circuit and the Fourth Circuit also demonstrate how the excessive force
analysis and the qualified immunity analysis interact to hyper-surveil the
behavior of plaintiffs and obfuscate the behavior of defendants. In Nelson v.
City of Battle Creek,219 the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision
to deny qualified immunity to an officer who shot and injured a teenage boy
(“N.K.”) playing with a B.B. gun.220 The key factual dispute in Nelson was
whether the officer decided to shoot N.K. before or after N.K. attempted to
toss the B.B. gun to the ground in compliance with the officer’s orders.221
Notably, the district court rejected granting summary judgment to the officer
because the legal question of qualified immunity “turn[ed] on disputed facts
and depend[ed] on which view of the facts the jury might accept.”222
However, denying that this dispute warranted deferring to a factfinder’s
judgment, the Sixth Circuit granted qualified immunity to the officer.
The Sixth Circuit’s view of the facts isolated the defendant from
scrutiny. In reconstructing the critical moment when the gun was fired, the
court posited there was no real dispute because the testimonies “do not create
a dispute of fact as to when [the officer] decided to shoot,” when “[the officer]
saw N.K. grab and raise the gun.”223 Critically, the court noted that the
plaintiff “fail[ed] to dispute this fact because N.K. and other witnesses cannot
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
802 F. App’x 983 (6th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 984.
Id. at 986–97.
Id. at 987 (emphasis added).
Id. at 988.
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speak to [the officer’s] decision-making or his perception of harm in the twosecond span the events unfolded.”224 Instead of focusing on when the gun
was actually fired, which could be objectively determined from the video
footage of the incident, the court held that the critical moment was when the
officer decided to shoot, a subjective decision entirely internal to the
officer.225 Obviously, the exact moment an officer decided to shoot cannot
be gleaned by any amount of objective evidence. Here, by shifting the critical
factual inquiry from a moment objectively ascertainable through video
footage or witness accounts, to a moment which objective evidence cannot
address, the court insulated the officer from scrutiny.226
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Estate of Jones v. City of
Martinsburg227 proves a telling counter-example to Nelson. In Jones, the
court reversed summary judgment awarded by the district court to the
defendants to hold that five law enforcement officers who shot a homeless
man twenty-two times to death after he was stopped for jaywalking did not
merit qualified immunity.228 Though noteworthy for the court’s dicta, which,
in its concluding remarks about the case, explicitly referenced George Floyd
and stated that to award qualified immunity in this case “would signal
absolute immunity for fear-based use of deadly force, which we cannot
accept,”229 Jones is also notable for the path the court took to arrive at its
conclusion.
At first glance, the Fourth Circuit’s reversal of qualified immunity
seems surprising based on facts unfavorable to the decedent, Jones. At the
time of the encounter with law enforcement, Jones was armed with a small
knife, which he later used to stab an officer.230 Further, Jones resisted verbal
commands to drop the knife.231 Based on these facts, the lower court
concluded that Jones presented an “ongoing threat” to the officers, justifying
their use of force, because he possessed a weapon at the time of his death.232
Yet, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Jones
224. Id. (emphasis added).
225. Id.
226. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Moore criticized both the majority’s “metaphysical line
drawing” between the defendant’s decision to shoot and actually shooting, as well as the majority’s
analysis of the plaintiff’s conduct. Id. at 991 (Moore, J., dissenting). Specifically, Judge Moore
criticized the majority’s decision to focus heavily on an analysis of the plaintiff’s conduct within a
two-second time span. In language relevant to this analysis, Judge Moore accused the majority of
“adjusting the ‘clearly established law’ lens to a microscopic level.” Id. at 991–92 (emphasis added).
227. 961 F.3d 661 (4th Cir. 2020).
228. Id. at 664.
229. Id. at 673.
230. Id. at 665.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 666.
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was “secured” and “incapacitated” in the moments before his death, 233 and
therefore the officers’ use of force was unreasonable.234
In arriving at its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit went to great lengths to
distinguish the possession of a weapon from Jones’s ability to use or wield
the weapon. In the court’s eyes, Jones was “secured” because, after being
“tased four times, hit in the brachial plexus, kicked, and placed in a choke
hold,”235 Jones fell to the ground, his left arm falling “limply to his body,” so
that he would have been physically unable to wield the knife.236 Beyond
Jones’s physical incapacitation, the Court noted the position of his body on
the ground, the number of officers surrounding Jones, and the
“inaccessible”237 location of the knife” as further support for the fact that
Jones was secured.
Thus, instead of focusing on a simple list of potentially damning facts,
all centered on the decedent’s conduct (i.e., Jones had a knife, Jones fled from
an officer, Jones resisted arrest, and Jones stabbed an officer), the Court
fleshed out a moving picture of the encounter, attempting to contextualize the
facts within the dynamics between Jones and the officers. Towards the end
of the analysis, the court “zoomed out” even more broadly to capture the
overarching context of Jones’s encounter with police:
Having zoomed in on the precise moments before Jones’s death,
we pull back for context. The defendants portray Jones as a
fleeing, armed suspect, who was not cooperating with law
enforcement and had even reportedly “hit” an officer, displacing
that officer’s hat . . . Jones was not an armed felon on the run, nor
a fleeing suspect luring officers into a high-speed car chase. Jones
was walking in the road next to the sidewalk . . . . He was without
housing and had a knife on his person . . . . What we see is a scared
man who is confused about what he did wrong, and an officer that
does nothing to alleviate that man’s fears. That is the broader
context in which five officers took Jones’s life.238
In Jones, the court understood that “zoom[ing] in” on the precise
moments of the encounter actually crippled its analysis by forcing the court
to focus on minutiae: Did Jones’s arm fall to the ground before or after the
first shot was fired? Was his body fully on top of his other arm, making the
knife inaccessible? At what angle was Jones’s holding the knife? By
focusing on the span of several seconds, the lower court’s analysis was
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 664.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 669.
Id.
Id. at 669.
Id. at 670–71.
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infected with a kind of myopia. Instead, the Fourth Circuit chose to claw its
way out of an analytical hole and “zoom out” to claim the power of context.
Context revealed the more important facts. Jones was simply jaywalking on
the street. He was schizophrenic and did not understand what he was being
asked. He was experiencing homelessness. For this, he was shot twenty-two
times by five police officers.
“Zooming out” also allowed the court to subtly scrutinize the
defendant’s behavior. By making observations like “[Officer Lehman]
quickly escalated the encounter,” and pointing out that the “officer [did]
nothing to alleviate [the] man’s fears,”239 the court emphasized facts that
highlighted the officers’ role in the encounter.
Although the Sixth Circuit in Nelson “zoomed in” on the plaintiff’s
behavior, interpreting the clearly established right at stake at a “microscopic”
level, the Fourth Circuit in Jones zoomed out, pulling back for context in
order to reclaim an objective lens.
c. Jones v. Treubig and Franklin v. Franklin City: At What Level
Should the Defendant’s Conduct Be Scrutinized?
Finally, a comparison of the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Jones
v. Treubig240 (“Treubig”) and the Eighth Circuit’s recent decision in Franklin
v. Franklin County241 perhaps most starkly illustrates how the qualified
immunity analysis insulates defendants from judicial scrutiny.
In Franklin, after a man died in police custody following a confrontation
with officers, the Eighth Circuit reversed a denial of summary judgment to
two of the officers involved in the encounter.242 Police arrested Franklin for
“walking along a road” and “swinging a stick like a sword.”243 At
containment, officers attempted to move Franklin to an isolation cell for
arguing with other prisoners.244 During a violent encounter, the officers
kicked Franklin, pinned him to the ground under the weight of several
officers, tased him at least two times, and put him in handcuffs.245 Upon
arriving in the cell, the officers attempted to remove the handcuffs, but
because Franklin was still “resisting,” the officers kept him pinned to the
ground, applying their bodyweight, and tased him up to five more times. 246

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at 671.
963 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2020).
956 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 1060–61.
Id. at 1061.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1061.
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Franklin died as a result of “methamphetamine intoxication, exertion,
struggle, restraint, and multiple electro muscular disruption device
applications.”247
In Franklin, the court hyper-focused on the decedent’s conduct to
conclude that he was acting “violently” and therefore the officers’ use of
force was constitutional.248 The majority characterized Franklin as violent
during the encounter, even though the officers tased Franklin up to eight
times when he was already handcuffed and on the ground, because “the threat
of Franklin’s violent aggression did not subside until after the final shot of
the taser,” and “Franklin acted violently and uncooperatively immediately
before each shock of the taser.”249 By breaking down the encounter to a series
of truncated events, the court decided Franklin was “violent” because he
showed minimal signs of resistance in the mere seconds between each taser
deployment. The court hyper-focused not only Franklin’s conduct, but the
hypothetical threat someone in Franklin’s position would pose. Instead of
inquiring whether Franklin actually posed a threat to officers while pinned to
the ground in handcuffs, warranting the use of a taser eight times, the court
merely concluded, “[a] person in handcuffs can still present a danger to
officers.”250
At the same time, the court shifted any critical gaze away from the
officers, minimizing the officers’ decision to use force by suggesting taser
deployment on drive-stun mode “only causes discomfort and does not
incapacitate the subject.”251 The court avoided scrutinizing the defendant
officers’ choice to continue to use force simply by citing to the Supreme
Court’s dicta in Plumhoff v. Rickard, 252 where the Court concluded that when
officers are justified in firing at a suspect “to end a severe threat to public
safety” the officers do not need to stop until the “threat has ended.”253 Yet,
the proposition that Franklin, a man handcuffed in an isolation cell, presented
“a severe threat to public safety” at an analogous level to a man involved in
a high-speed car chase is questionable at best. The court employed a dubious
analogy to avoid scrutinizing whether the officers were reasonable in
continuing to use force by deploying a taser eight times.
In contrast—in an analysis that contradicts Franklin at almost every
turn—the Second Circuit held that an officer was not entitled to qualified

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id. at 1062–63.
Id. at 1062 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1062–63.
Id. at 1063 (quoting Brossart v. Janke, 859 F.3d 616, 626 (8th Cir. 2017)).
572 U.S. 765 (2014).
Id. at 777.
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immunity for multiple deployments of a taser in Jones v. Treubig,254 because
the court closely scrutinized the defendant’s conduct in-between taser
deployments.255 The plaintiff, Jones, who was attempting to return his
uncle’s prescription medication, was stopped by police and resisted arrest.256
The defendant-officer tased Jones—while Jones was laying, pinned, on the
ground—two times.
In Treubig, the court scrutinized the officer’s decision to deploy the
taser a second time separately from the first taser deployment. Instead of
simply accepting that Jones’s original resistance meant continual resistance,
the court analyzed whether, based on jury interrogatories at the district court,
evidence supported that Jones was resisting arrest at the time of the second
tasing.257 The court emphasized that Jones did not concede that he could
physically move after the first tasing, leading to a genuine dispute of material
fact.258 The court then closely scrutinized the officer’s behavior, emphasizing
the critical fact that after deploying the first taser, the officer had time to
reassess the situation before deploying a second time, in order to refute that
the officer could not adequately assess whether Jones was still resisting in a
rapidly evolving situation.259 Thus, by turning the critical lens sharply on the
defendant’s knowledge immediately before the second tasing, the Second
Circuit reached the result that a second use of force could be unreasonable
under the totality of the circumstances.
d. Summary
In summary, these cases demonstrate how the Graham excessive force
analysis encourages courts to hyper-focus on the plaintiffs, leading to factual
reconstruction which “zooms in” on plaintiffs’ behavior, focusing on
minutiae and losing the power of context and objectivity. Simultaneously,
the current qualified immunity analysis ratchets up the level of subjectivity
in excessive force cases by obfuscating the behavior of defendants.
ii. The Qualified Immunity Analysis Further Obfuscates the
Defendant Officer from Scrutiny in Excessive Force Cases in
Four Key Ways.
The qualified immunity analysis further obfuscates the behavior of
defendants in excessive force cases in four key ways. First, the clearly
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

963 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2020).
Id. at 230.
Id. at 220.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 230–31.
Id. at 229.
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established law standard prevents courts from scrutinizing a defendant’s
actual knowledge of their actions’ constitutionality.
Second, the
abandonment of the subjective prong of the analysis casts a veil over a
defendant’s state of mind. Third, courts are primed to overlook the behavior
of defendants through the stated purposes of the qualified immunity analysis
to decide fewer cases on the merits. Fourth, the current state of qualified
immunity law encourages courts to minimize the role of an objective
factfinder.
a. The Clearly Established Law Standard Prevents the Court
from Scrutinizing an Officer’s Actual Knowledge
First, in the “clearly established law” analysis, courts use past legal
decisions about use of force as a proxy for whether the officer had notice of
whether a certain use of force would be constitutional.260 However, as others
have noted, whether case law actually supplies government officials notice
of the law is in itself a questionable proposition; it has even been called a
“legal fiction.”261 When previous legal decisions are rigidly accepted as the
sole indicator of constitutional notice, an officer’s actual knowledge of
whether their use of force was reasonable or constitutional becomes obsolete.
In other words, it is possible that an officer may possess actual knowledge or
suspicion that a certain use of force is probably unconstitutional, but if the
accepted legal proxy does not exist, what the officer did or did not know does
not matter. The court is disallowed from scrutinizing or probing the officer’s
actual knowledge.
Simultaneously, the Supreme Court’s lack of clear direction on
acceptable sources of clearly established law exacerbates the problem.
Sources of persuasive authority may allow plaintiffs to show that even if a
prior legal decision is not “on point,” police officers had constructive notice
that their acts may be unconstitutional through accepted and widely followed
department rules or official manuals of conduct. However, only a few
circuits allow an analysis of persuasive authority to establish notice of
unconstitutionality.262 It is also true that the police department may strictly
prohibit a certain use or method of force, but this prohibition would still not
serve as adequate evidence that the officer should have been on notice about
their conduct. In summary, the more rigidly the clearly established law
analysis is applied, the more the defendant-public official is insulated from

260. See supra Section I.B.ii.
261. See Finn, supra note 83, at 464 (“The presumption that public officials are aware of ongoing
developments in constitutional law is well recognized as a legal fiction.”).
262. See supra Section I.B.ii.b.

866

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:830

real scrutiny. The defendant-law-enforcement officer’s actual knowledge of
potential unconstitutionality is essentially off-limits for courts to scrutinize.
b. The Abandonment of the Subjective Prong of the Analysis
Casts a Veil Over the Officer’s State of Mind.
Similarly, the current law prohibits any real scrutiny of defendant-law
enforcement officers through the abandonment of the subjective prong of the
qualified immunity analysis. Before Harlow v. Fitzgerald,263 courts could
scrutinize whether a defendant-executive official acted with “malicious
intention” to deprive an individual of a Constitutional right.264 The showing
of malicious intent sufficed to prove the officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity. By forbidding courts to inquire whether an officer actually
intended to act unconstitutionally, the Court shielded the officer from
scrutiny. Now, a police officer may actually intend to act unconstitutionally,
but their conduct will be excused so long as no prior case provided “notice”
that the behavior was definitively unconstitutional. In so doing, the Court
further shields the defendant from real scrutiny.
For example, in Estate of Jones,265 the Fourth Circuit introduced facts
gathered through video recording, which subtly impugned the officers’ state
of mind at the time of the encounter. The Court specified that, “[o]ne officer
can be heard loudly calling Jones a ‘mother***ker.’ . . . At least one officer
can be seen kicking Jones violently as he lay on the ground,”266 and later, that
after killing Jones, the officers concluded they had “to gather some f**king
story.”267 These details could feasibly provide evidence that the officers
knew their conduct was unconstitutional. Similarly, in Mullenix,268 Justice
Sotomayor pointed to a statement made by the officer after he shot and killed
the decedent suggesting he had acted in bad faith.269 Yet, under the current
regime, these facts are analytically useless. Courts are disallowed from
probing the officers’ state of mind. The defendants’ real motives and
intentions are hidden behind an analytical veil.

263. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
264. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
265. Estate of Jones v. City of Martinsburg, 961 F.3d 661 (4th Cir. 2020).
266. Id. at 665.
267. Id. at 666.
268. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (per curiam).
269. Id. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (After killing the decedent, the defendant said to his
commanding officer, “How’s that for proactive?,” referencing a conversation they had earlier that
day).
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c. Courts are Primed to Overlook an Officer’s Behavior Through
the Instruction to Decide Fewer Cases on the Merits.
Further, at a meta-level, the purpose of the qualified immunity analysis
gives courts incentive to overlook the behavior of defendants in their
analyses. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the purpose of
qualified immunity is to reduce the number of cases that proceed to trial
against the government.270 Thus, the Court’s “goal in formulating qualified
immunity is chiefly to affect the administration of summary judgment in
constitutional tort actions.”271 As a result, courts approach the qualified
immunity analysis in excessive force cases with a predisposition towards
awarding summary judgment to defendant-officers.
Notably, the stated goal of qualified immunity creates a procedural
paradox for courts analyzing the facts of a case. Appellate courts may review
summary judgment awarded to police officers on issues of excessive force
when a matter of law is at stake, subject to de novo review. Based on the
relevant standard under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts must
review the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to
determine whether summary judgment was warranted when there is a
genuine dispute of material fact.272 But the Supreme Court’s essentially
procedural mandate, clothed with the veil of substance, affects how lower
courts must view disputed facts. Directed by the overarching goal of saving
the government from the burdens of a real trial, judges are already primed to
view the facts in favor of defendants.
The Court’s mandate to decide fewer cases on the merits is critically
important to the framing of government surveillance. A court’s standard of
review can be understood as the color applied to the courts’ critical lens.
When the standard of review is favorable to the non-moving party, the court
will view the facts “colored” by that party’s perspective.
On the Court, dissenters such as Justice Sotomayor have critiqued the
Court for failing apply the correct critical lens in excessive force cases.273
For example, in her Mullenix274 dissent, Justice Sotomayor noted that her

270. See supra Section I.A.
271. See Jeffries, supra note 51, at 866.
272. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
273. Other current and former dissenters on the issue of qualified immunity, especially as applied
in cases of excessive force, include Justice Clarence Thomas, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and
Justice John Paul Stevens. See supra notes 118, 127.
274. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (per curiam).
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denial of qualified immunity followed directly from the correct application
of the relevant standard of review.275
Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority’s factual reconstruction even
more pointedly in a similar dissent in Kisela v. Hughes,276 where the Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s denial of qualified immunity to a police officer
who shot a woman behaving erratically with lethal force.277 The Court
arrived at its conclusion by focusing on the plaintiff’s behavior through the
eyes of the defendant officer: “He was confronted with a woman who had
just been seen hacking a tree with a large kitchen knife and whose behavior
was erratic enough to cause a concerned bystander to call 911 . . . .”278
However, Justice Sotomayor chastised the majority for failing to construe the
facts in the light most favorable to the decedent:
This case arrives at our doorstep on summary judgment, so we
must “view the evidence . . . in the light most favorable to”
Hughes, the nonmovant, “with respect to the central facts of this
case.” The majority purports to honor this well-settled principle,
but its efforts fall short. Although the majority sets forth most of
the relevant events that transpired, it conspicuously omits several
critical facts and draws premature inferences that bear on the
qualified-immunity inquiry. Those errors are fatal to its analysis,
because properly construing all of the facts in the light most
favorable to Hughes, and drawing all inferences in her favor, a jury
could find that the following events occurred on the day of Hughes’
encounter with the Tucson police.279
Here, Justice Sotomayor essentially accused her fellow Justices of
failing to view the facts of the case objectively. By hyper-focusing on the
behavior of the plaintiff and failing to apply a standard of review that
construed facts in favor of the plaintiff, the Justices overlooked “critical
facts” that bore on the clearly established law analysis. For example, “the
police officers themselves never witnessed any erratic conduct,”280 “the other
two officers on the scene declined to fire at Hughes,”281 suggesting that lesser
means of force were necessary, and “the officers did not observe any illegal
activity while at the scene.”282
275. Id. at 313 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Resolving all factual disputes in favor of plaintiffs,
as the Court must on a motion for summary judgment,” she noted, “Mullenix knew the following
facts . . . .”)
276. 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (per curiam).
277. Id. at 1150, 1152.
278. Id. at 1153.
279. Id. at 1155 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
280. Id. at 1157.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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d. The Current State of Qualified Immunity Law Encourages
Courts to Minimize the Role of an Objective Factfinder Such
as the Jury.
Finally, the current qualified immunity analysis encourages courts to
minimize the role of an objective factfinder. Because courts are instructed to
reduce the number of cases decided on the merits, courts are more likely to
minimize factual disputes that could conceivably go before a jury. For
example, in Nelson, 283 the Sixth Circuit denied that any factual dispute
existed as to whether the plaintiff had already thrown down his weapon when
the officer fired by re-characterizing the critical inquiry as the moment when
the officer decided to shoot.284 The court then substituted its own judgment
for that of a potential jury’s to conclude that the moment that the officer
decided to shoot was before the plaintiff had dropped his weapon.285
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in Estate of Jones286 emphasized and
elevated the role of the reasonable factfinder.287 In fact, the emphasis on the
reasonable factfinder was key to the court’s clearly established law analysis
in Estate of Jones. The court framed the constitutional question at stake in
the case as whether at the time of the shooting “it was clearly established that
officers may not shoot a secured or incapacitated person.”288 However, given
that Jones was armed with a knife and had attempted to stab an officer, this
framing was not necessarily intuitive. The court arrived at its framing by
drawing on the perspective of a phantom jury in reconstructing facts. The
court concluded that Jones was “secured” before he was shot because a
reasonable jury could find that he could not move when pinned to the ground
by five officers, and “incapacitated” because “a jury could reasonably infer
that Jones was struggling to breathe.”289
Throughout its analysis, the court continually presented two potential
versions of events and demurred that a reasonable fact-finder would be able
to find either for the Estate or for the defendants, justifying the case
proceeding to trial.290 For example, in addressing the “problematic” fact that
Jones possessed a weapon, the court concluded that that “these admitted facts
do not preclude a jury from finding that [Jones] was secured.”291 Similarly,

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Nelson v. City of Battle Creek, 802 F. App’x 983 (6th Cir. 2020).
See supra notes 223–226 and accompanying text.
Nelson, 802 F. App’x at 988.
Estate of Jones v. City of Martinsburg, 961 F.3d 661 (4th Cir. 2020).
See supra notes 233–238 and accompanying text.
Estate of Jones, 961 F.3d at 668.
Id. at 668–69.
See supra notes 233–239 and accompanying text.
Estate of Jones, 961 F.3d at 669.
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the court admitted that “to be sure, the incident moved quickly,” but still, “[a]
jury could reasonably find that Jones was secured before the officers backed
away, and that [they] could have disarmed Jones and handcuffed him . . . .”292
The court’s focus on the reasonable factfinder in in Estate of Jones was
critical. Instead of solely reconstructing the facts through the perspective of
a reasonable officer on the scene, the court introduced the perspective of a
phantom third-party. Through this phantom party’s eyes, a quickly moving
encounter between a citizen and an officer became subject to alternative
explanations, highlighting the real factual disputes that should proceed to
trial, instead of emphasizing what the officer thought, felt, and believed about
the situation. The Fourth Circuit did not discount the officer’s perspective,
but rather presented the officer’s perspective as one of two competing
explanations of the encounter. The court then considered whether both
explanations were sufficiently viable to proceed to trial. In this way, the court
staunchly pushed against the inertia of subjectivity in the clearly established
law analysis.
Similarly, in Treubig,293 the Second Circuit focused on the perspective
of the reasonable factfinder.294 At trial, after the jury awarded Jones nominal
and punitive damages against Treubig, the district court granted judgment as
a matter of law to the defendant.295 On appeal, the Second Circuit concluded
that the court had incorrectly taken a question of fact from the jury:
Not only was there evidence in the record to support that Jones was
no longer resisting arrest at the time of second tasing, but the jury
made that specific factual finding in a special interrogatory.
Because that jury finding was rationally supported by the abovereferenced evidence in the record (if credited), it must be accepted
for purposes of the qualified immunity analysis utilizing, to the
extent any other factual issues remain, the underlying evidence in
the light most favorable to Jones. . . . And, importantly, disputed
material issues regarding the reasonableness of an officer’s
perception of the facts (whether mistaken or not) is the province of
the jury, while the reasonableness of an officer’s view of the law is
decided by the district court.”296
Thus, the court defended the jury’s role as the ultimate arbiter of facts,
even disputed facts pertaining to an officer’s perception of the encounter.
This emphasis is critical to the framing of surveillance because the Second
Circuit resisted insulating the officer’s view of the facts from scrutiny.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id.
Jones v. Treubig, 963 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2020).
See supra notes 257–259 and accompanying text.
Jones, 963 F.3d at 221.
Id. at 230–31 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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Instead of allowing the state official’s view of the threat determine the
outcome of the case, the Second Circuit instead insisted that even his
perception should be subject to scrutiny by a reasonable fact-finder.
e. Summary
In excessive force cases, the qualified immunity analysis leads courts to
closely inspect the behavior of plaintiffs while veiling the defendants from
scrutiny.
The Graham excessive force analysis leads to factual
reconstruction that “zooms in” on plaintiffs’ behavior, focusing on minutiae
and losing the power of context and objectivity. Simultaneously, the
qualified immunity analysis ratchets up the level of subjectivity in excessive
force cases by obfuscating the behavior of defendants. The qualified
immunity analysis obfuscates defendants from scrutiny in four ways. First,
the clearly established law standard prevents courts from scrutinizing a
defendant’s actual knowledge of his actions’ constitutionality. Second, the
abandonment of the subjective prong of the analysis casts a veil over a
defendant’s state of mind. Third, courts are primed to overlook the behavior
of defendants through the stated purpose of the qualified immunity analysis
to decide fewer cases on the merits. Fourth, the current state of qualified
immunity law encourages courts to minimize the role of an objective
factfinder. As a result of the interplay between the qualified immunity and
excessive force analyses, cases which would typically proceed to trial based
on a dispute about the existence of material fact are decided summarily based
on the reconstruction of the factual record.
C. Reclaiming Objectivity Under the Qualified Immunity Analysis in
Excessive Force Claims
This Section inquires as to how the connection between government
surveillance and qualified immunity may elucidate practical solutions for
lower federal courts and state courts in excessive force claims brought under
Section 1983 or state analogues, informed by the case studies in Section II.B.
The framing of government surveillance illuminates a severe lack of
objectivity as the fatal flaw in the current state of the law. Thus, this Section
suggests ways that federal and state courts may regain analytical balance by
reclaiming objectivity within the framework accepted by the Supreme Court.
This Section also includes suggestions for other institutional actors, such as
legislators and the general public. Seven brief observations emerge.
First, courts should emphasize and elevate the role of the jury. Second,
courts should hesitate to interpret the Supreme Court’s substantive changes
to qualified immunity doctrine as procedural mandates. Third, courts can
leverage judicial discretion to scrutinize the conduct of defendants in
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reconstructing facts. Fourth, members of the public should continue to record
police-citizen encounters. Fifth, legislative reformers should consider
restoring the subjective prong of the qualified immunity analysis. Sixth,
courts should use persuasive authority in defining clearly established law.
And finally, courts should consider their unique institutional competencies
and power over individuals deprived of constitutional rights when shaping
qualified immunity doctrine.
i. Courts Should Emphasize and Elevate the Role of the Jury.
Courts applying the qualified immunity analysis may reach vastly
different results when the perspective of a reasonable factfinder is introduced,
emphasized, and elevated in excessive force cases. As explained in Section
II.B, the “double layer of reasonableness” created by the qualified immunity
analysis pushes courts to careen into subjectivity when reconstructing facts
in excessive force cases. One way to reclaim objectivity, as Justice
Sotomayor’s dissent in Kisela297 and cases such as Estate of Jones298 and
Treubig299 suggest, is to incorporate the perspective of a phantom, objective
third-party. In these cases, the construct of the reasonable factfinder
functions to highlight the existence of genuine factual disputes.
Similarly, the reasonable factfinder construct creates a way that courts
can scrutinize a defendant’s perception of the facts. Importantly, this
suggestion does not impugn the directives of the Supreme Court. As the
Second Circuit in Treubig emphasized, an officer’s perception of the law is
for courts to decide, yet the officer’s perception of facts is not beyond the
scrutiny of the jury. Courts may obey the directive to analyze the excessive
force claim from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, while
simultaneously allowing that perspective to be scrutinized by a reasonable,
objective factfinder.
ii. Courts Should Hesitate to Interpret the Court’s Stated Goals in
the Qualified Immunity Analysis as Justifying a Procedural
Change to Standards of Review.
The Supreme Court has, time and again, emphasized that the goal of
qualified immunity is to insulate the government from the burdens of
discovery and litigation by deciding fewer cases on the merits.300 Yet, the
Court cannot change the standard of review applicable in a case without
formally revising the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As Justice
297.
298.
299.
300.

Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (per curiam).
Estate of Jones v. City of Martinsburg, 961 F.3d 661 (4th Cir. 2020).
Jones v. Treubig, 963 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2020).
See supra Section II.B.
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Sotomayor pointed out in Kisela, when cases arrive on appeal from summary
judgment, as they often do in qualified immunity cases, courts still must view
the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.301 Thus, when
the defendant appeals a denial of qualified immunity, the suggestion that
courts should be predisposed to settle cases through summary judgment
seems to be in direct tension with the rule that the court must view all
evidence in favor of (in this case) the plaintiff.
But when these two directives conflict, a court should resist the impetus
to allow the Supreme Court’s motivations for the qualified immunity analysis
to change the way it applies the relevant standard of review. As Section II.B
demonstrates, the standard of review has the potential to powerfully impact
the outcome of the case on appeal by framing the way that the court
reconstructs fact. For example, in Treubig, the district court belatedly
granted judgment as a matter of law on the issue of qualified immunity to the
defendant after a jury had awarded damages to the plaintiff.302 Arguably, the
standard of review the Second Circuit applied on appeal, that the court must
“consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom
the motion was made,”303 and “give that party the benefit of all reasonable
inferences that the jury might have drawn in his favor from the evidence,”304
changed the outcome in favor of the plaintiffs. The Second Circuit applied a
critical lens favorable to the plaintiff in order to scrutinize the actions of the
defendant before the deployment of a second taser strike.
This analysis has demonstrated that the court’s method of factual
reconstruction—namely, who and what the court chooses to scrutinize—
matters. Thus, courts should hesitate to construe the Supreme Court’s
predisposition towards summary judgment as license to change the standard
of review, which influences who the court chooses to scrutinize.
iii. Courts Can Leverage Judicial Discretion to Scrutinize the
Conduct of Defendants in Reconstructing Facts.
In some ways, the qualified immunity analysis is interpretively
restrictive (in other words, appellate courts risk reversal by the Supreme
Court if the analysis is applied incorrectly).305 Yet, this Comment has
demonstrated that courts also enjoy wide discretion in applying the qualified

301. See supra notes 271–275 and accompanying text.
302. 963 F.3d 214 at 216.
303. Id. at 224 (quoting Black v. Finantra Capital, Inc., 418 F.3d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 2005)
(quotation marks omitted)).
304. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a).
305. See discussion of the Supreme Court and summary reversals of Ninth Circuit decisions,
supra Section I.B.iii.

874

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:830

immunity analysis. Courts reach vastly disparate outcomes applying the
same law to similar facts. In the Second Circuit, a court may choose to
scrutinize a second taser deployment as analytically separate from the first
deployment and conclude that a reasonable jury may find the second
deployment unreasonable.306 In the Sixth Circuit, a court may decline to
scrutinize seven subsequent taser deployments, concluding that
reasonableness is solely determined by the hypothetical existence of an
ongoing threat.307
Whether such wide judicial discretion is analytically desirable is
debatable. The Section 1983 action theoretically provides a cause of recourse
for individuals whose rights have been violated by government actors. The
fact that an individual may not have a remedy for this violation, solely as an
accident of geography, seems to be an aberration of this principle. In
addition, as discussed in Part I, the Supreme Court has issued seemingly
competing and conflicting directives in this area of law. Yet, scholars have
suggested that wide judicial discretion may simply be par for the course with
constitutional tort law. 308 In other words, even if the Supreme Court spoke
more directly on conflicting issues, Section 1983 actions would still require
judges to use creativity and ingenuity in balancing the interests of the
government versus the interest of individuals.309
Notably, courts enjoy the most latitude in reconstructing facts. The
Supreme Court cannot simply overturn a case because it disagrees with a
court’s finding of facts but must also take issue with the court’s legal
application of the qualified immunity doctrine. Thus, the Supreme Court has
often seemed to apply summary reversals to the most egregious aberrations
from their desired application of qualified immunity based on the clearly
established law standard. For example, in reversing the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in City of Escondido v. Emmons,310 the Supreme Court chastised the
Ninth Circuit for not even attempting to define the constitutional right with a
level of specificity, instead concluding that “the ‘right to be free of excessive
force’ was clearly established” by the Fourth Amendment.311
Cases such as Estate of Jones v. Martinsburg312 demonstrate how a court
can make a good-faith attempt to define the constitutional violation at a high
level of specificity, while taking advantage of its wide discretion in

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

See supra notes 257–258 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 248–252 and accompanying text.
See Jeffries, supra note 141, at 243.
Id.
139 S. Ct. 500 (2019).
Id. at 503 (quoting Emmons v. City of Escondido, 716 Fed. App’x 724, 726 (9th Cir. 2018)).
961 F.3d 661 (4th Cir. 2020).
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reconstructing facts. In Estate of Jones, by applying the correct standard of
review, the Fourth Circuit engaged in a thorough analysis of the facts to frame
a specific constitutional violation.313 Critically, instead of hinging its
conclusion on a list of facts solely damning to the plaintiff, the court
contextualized unfavorable facts in the wider encounter between police and
the decedent. Estate of Jones demonstrates that courts do not have to hyperfocus on the conduct of plaintiffs while obfuscating the conduct of defendants
in the qualified immunity analysis. By acknowledging facts unfavorable to
the decedent, yet simultaneously applying a critical lens to the defendants’
conduct, the court used its discretion to conduct an analysis which meets
Section 1983’s foundational command to balance government interests and
individual rights.
iv. Members of the Public Should Continue to Record Encounters
Between Citizens and Law Enforcement Officers as an Aid to
Courts in Reconstructing Facts Objectively.
One tool courts can employ in reconstructing facts objectively is the use
of recording technologies. Nominally worn as a safeguard against police
abuse of power, ongoing debate remains about the efficacy of police-worn
body cameras.314 In addition, the fact that cameras are outward-facing raises
its own issues within the framing of government surveillance. One could
argue that in a police-citizen encounter, the fact that the citizen’s behavior is
the main subject of recording, not the officer’s, only adds fuel to the fire of
subjectivity. If introduced as evidence, the court sees the encounter from the
law enforcement officer’s view, conceivably duplicating Graham v.
Connor’s315 command to view the facts through the eyes of the reasonable
officer at the scene.
Yet, recording technologies can still play a role in reclaiming
objectivity. For example, in Estate of Jones,316 the Fourth Circuit frequently
drew on video recordings of the police-citizen encounter to intersperse its
analysis with details that painted a more complete picture of the
circumstances surrounding the decedent’s death. The court used recordings
to conclude that the decedent was incapacitated at the time of his death based

313. Id. at 669. (Specifically, whether police could use deadly force against a man who was
secured and incapacitated).
314. Candice Norwood, Body Cameras Are Seen as Key to Police Reform. But Do They Increase
Accountability?,
PBS
NEWS
HOUR
(June
25,
2020,
4:41
PM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/body-cameras-are-seen-as-key-to-police-reform-but-dothey-increase-accountability.
315. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
316. 961 F.3d 661.
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on the sounds of gurgling and choking caught on tape.317 In addition, the
Estate of Jones court scrutinized the behavior of the defendant-police officers
by pointing out that one officer could be seen kicking the decedent after he
was already restrained.318 The court also chose to include details gleaned
from the recording technology that impugned the officers’ state of mind.319
In Estate of Jones, the court used technology to subtly turn the weight of the
analytical lens back to the defendants, regaining balance in an analysis which
typically hyper-focuses on plaintiffs’ conduct.
Of course, the use of recording technologies will be most beneficial, and
most powerful, when third-party witnesses and bystanders capture
encounters between citizens and law enforcement officers objectively, and in
full. Through the framing of government surveillance, nothing could more
powerfully challenge the state’s critical focus on its citizens. Simply consider
the power and impact that one such recording has had on the public
conscience and imagination—a witness’ recording of the murder of George
Floyd at the hands of Minneapolis police officers.320 Courts have wide
latitude to reconstruct facts, but what if the court is forced to watch both sides
of the facts play out before its eyes? How can the court, faced with an
objective recording of the encounter, faithfully apply the lens of the
defendant-police officer in reconstructing facts—especially if the
defendant’s behavior is egregious and gruesome to watch? Arguably, these
kinds of recordings have the potential to seriously challenge the current state
of qualified immunity law by providing an undeniably objective version of
events.
v. Legislative Reformers Should Consider Restoring the Subjective
Prong of the Qualified Immunity Analysis.
The discussion of recording technologies exposes a related solution to
the issues posed by the qualified immunity analysis. As the law currently
stands, even if a recording technology captured clear evidence of malice, it
would not matter. In Estate of Jones,321 as well as Justice Sotomayor’s
317. Id. at 669 (“Jones had been tased four times, hit in the brachial plexus, kicked, and placed
in a choke hold, at which point gurgling can be heard in the video.”); id. at 665 (“A loud choking
or gurgling sound, which seems to be coming from Jones, is audible on Staub’s audio recorder at
this time.”).
318. Id. at 665.
319. Id. at 666 (noting that after fatally shooting Jones, one officer exclaimed, we “have to gather
some f**king story”).
320. Helier Cheung, George Floyd Death: Why US Protests Are So Powerful This Time. BBC
(June 8, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52969905 (Explaining that George
Floyd’s death incited global outrage because the “gruesome” incident “was clearly recorded on
video,” making the officer’s malfeasance “obvious.”).
321. 961 F.3d 661.
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dissenting opinion in Mullenix,322 the judges identified facts about the
defendants’ conduct which feasibly impugned their state of mind at the time
the officials used force.323 Yet, based on Harlow, the malicious intent to
deprive an individual of a constitutional right is irrelevant to the qualified
immunity analysis.324 Many others have pointed out that restoring the
subjective prong of the qualified immunity analysis would create more
equitable results.325 This analysis has demonstrated that the rejection of
subjective intent is especially egregious because it further casts a veil over
defendant law enforcement officers, obfuscating state officials from real
scrutiny.
Thus, if legislators seek to reform, rather than abolish, the doctrine of
qualified immunity, specifying that plaintiffs can introduce evidence relating
to bad faith is a good place to start. Practically, a state legislature could craft
a claim which functions as a state analogue to Section 1983 and specify
within the text: Qualified immunity will not be available as a defense to these
claims if the public official can be shown to have been acting with malicious
intent or otherwise in bad faith to deprive an individual of a constitutional
right.
vi. Courts Should Use Persuasive Authority to Define Clearly
Established Law.
Courts should use sources of persuasive, as well as mandatory, authority
in the clearly established law analysis. As discussed in Section II.B, legal
decisions are probably not a realistic proxy for the defendant’s actual
knowledge or notice of unconstitutional force. However, within the law as it
currently stands, courts should at least attempt to broaden the universe of
potential case law available to plaintiffs in establishing constitutional notice.
For example, in Treubig,326 the Second Circuit drew on the decisions of sister
circuits to establish that an officer should be on notice that deploying a taser
a second time may be unconstitutional when the force is no longer necessary
due to the totality of the circumstances.327 Specifically, the court held that

322. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 313 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
323. Id. at 316 (observing that after killing the decedent, the defendant said to his commanding
officer, “How’s that for proactive?”, referencing a conversation they had earlier that day).
324. .See supra Section I.A.
325. .ee, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 8, at 73. (“Restoring the subjective prong to qualified
immunity analysis could also mitigate at least one serious concern with the doctrine. . . . If the
subjective prong were restored to the qualified immunity analysis, government officials would not
be entitled to qualified immunity if they knew or should have known that their conduct was
unlawful.”).
326. Jones v. Treubig, 963 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2020).
327. Id. at 236–37.
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the clearly established law was clear not only from the Second Circuit’s own
decisions, but also “reinforced by a compelling consensus of cases in our
sister circuits.”328 The court relied on cases from the Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits in determining that the law was clearly established.329
In Treubig, the Second Circuit correctly looked to these decisions to
support its analysis. By using persuasive sources of authority, the court
painted a more realistic picture of the defendant official’s knowledge at the
time of the encounter based on broadly accepted uses of force. Courts should
draw on persuasive authority especially when it takes the form of department
manuals, codes or trainings. These sources may provide direct evidence of
an officer’s actual knowledge at the time of use of force, and should not
escape close scrutiny.
vii. Courts Should Consider Their Institutional Competencies, As
Well As Their Power Over Individuals Deprived of
Constitutional Rights, While Crafting Qualified Immunity
Doctrine.
Judicial actors at each level have unique institutional competencies
which impact how courts approach excessive force claims and the doctrine
of qualified immunity. For example, most Section 1983 claims are heard by
federal courts, giving federal district and appellate courts an outsized
opportunity to shape the qualified immunity defense.330 Federal appellate
courts, especially, are subject only to the limitation of reversal by the
Supreme Court. However, federal district courts should also consider the
powerful role they play in qualified immunity analysis by creating and
shaping the factual record. This Comment has demonstrated how the
outcome of excessive force cases often turns on one or two critical facts.
Appellate courts are tasked with reviewing summary judgment granted based
on qualified immunity de novo, which means that appellate courts do not
have to take the district courts’ versions of events as a given. However,
district courts are still the first arena in which the factual record is created
and shaped, and judges are the powerful overseers of this process.
At the state level, state courts may enjoy the most judicial discretion and
latitude in shaping qualified immunity doctrine. Section 1983 claims can
also be brought in state courts, and state courts often hear these claims along
with state common law claims such as battery or assault, and claims brought
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. For a more thorough discussion of the concurrent jurisdiction of federal and state courts in
Section 1983 claims, see, e.g., Susan N. Herman, Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts,
54 BROOK L. REV. 1057 (1989).
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under state constitutional analogues to Section 1983. State courts have wide
latitude to apply state common law and to interpret state constitutional law.
Even though most states have some version of qualified immunity, critically,
states do not have to apply the same mode of federal analysis to state qualified
immunity doctrines. Thus, state courts are in a unique position to create and
craft remedies for individuals in Section 1983 claims by using their own
discretion beyond the doctrinal limitations of qualified immunity’s federal
counterpart.
Finally, others have established the role of courts in perpetuating racebased inequalities through over-policing and over-surveilling racial
minorities. Yet, this Comment has sought to demonstrate the unique role
courts may play in denying remedies to these individuals. In a common law
system, change occurs through the multiplication or whittling away of
precedent based on individual acts of judicial discretion. When courts apply
a qualified immunity analysis that fails to subject defendants to real scrutiny,
future, individual plaintiffs are those who will pay. These individuals are
often members of racial minority groups. Yet, precedents gather momentum
over time to transcend the level of the individual and impact our public
consciousness. Courts must acknowledge how deliberately failing to
scrutinize the conduct of law enforcement officers and “zooming in” on
plaintiffs’ conduct may directly impact and inflame racial and class-based
tensions. The framing of government surveillance is ultimately useful for
suggesting that the critical lens through which the court weighs the actions
of individuals and state officials, and more specifically, who the court
chooses to scrutinize, matters.
III. CONCLUSION
This Comment has introduced the concept of government surveillance
to re-frame the discussion surrounding the defense of qualified immunity in
cases brought under Section 1983 pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. The
qualified immunity analysis, based on its historical roots and present
application, can be considered a mode of government surveillance.
Specifically, as judges exercise their judicial discretion through doctrinal
interpretation, the qualified immunity analysis simultaneously “zooms in” on
plaintiffs’ behavior while obfuscating law enforcement officers’ conduct.
Though Section 1983 theoretically provides an individual cause of action for
the deprivation of constitutional liberties, the qualified immunity doctrine
creates a near-impenetrable veil under which state action is not seriously
scrutinized. Thus, state oppression lurks even in the legal claim which
supposedly creates a cause of action for the vindication of individual rights.
This analysis directly supports and extends the theory that Black, brown, and
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impoverished communities are overwhelmingly subject to government
surveillance through policing and the legal system. Even when the “bad
behavior” of a law enforcement officer is supposedly on trial, the court hypersurveils and punishes the conduct of the citizen bringing the claim through
the qualified immunity defense.
Finally, the framing of government surveillance elucidates practical
suggestions for various institutional actors including courts, legislators, and
the general public. Most importantly, courts must consider their institutional
competencies and power in shaping qualified immunity doctrine. Who and
what is scrutinized through the act of judicial interpretation matters.

